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Technological advancements such as Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and 
the Internet have made it easier and affordable to share information, which enables 
complex and time sensitive decisions to be made with higher confidence.  Further, 
advancements in information technology have dramatically increased the ability to store, 
manage, integrate, and correlate larger amounts of data to improve operational 
efficiency.  However, the same technologies that enable increased productivity also 
provide increased capabilities to those wishing to do harm. 
Today’s military leaders are faced with the challenge of deciding how to make 
geospatial information collected on military installations and organizations available to 
authorized communities of interest while simultaneously restricting access to protect 
operational security.  Often, these decisions are made without understanding how the 
sharing of certain combinations of data may pose a significant risk to protecting critical 
information, infrastructure or resources.  Information security has been an area of 
growing concern in the GeoBase community since, by definition, it is required to strike a 
balance between competing interests, each supported by federal policy: (1) the 
availability of data paid for by tax dollars and (2) the protection of data as required to 
mitigate risks. 
In this research, the security implications of the US Air Force GeoBase (the US 
Air Force’s applied Geospatial Information System) program will be explored.  The rapid 
expansion of the use of GeoBase to communities outside of the civil engineering field 
necessitates an examination of the intrinsic and extrinsic security risks of the 
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unconstrained sharing of geospatial information.  This research will explore difficulties 
encountered when attempting to rate the sensitivity of information, discuss new policies 
and procedures that have been implemented undertaken to protect the information, and 
propose technical and managerial control measures to facilitate sharing geospatial 
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GEOSPATIAL INFORMATIONAL SECURITY RISKS AND CONCERNS 
OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE GEOBASE PROGRAM 
 
 




Over the last decade, advancements in information technologies have dramatically 
reduced the costs involved with storing, managing and disseminating large amounts of 
data. These advancements have led to the development of Geospatial Information 
Systems (GIS) within the civil engineering community to share information with larger 
communities of interest, enabling complex decisions to be made more efficiently, with 
fewer resources, and at higher confidence levels.  Military leaders face the challenge of 
deciding how to make their geospatial information readily accessible to authorized parties 
while mitigating the risks associated with information sharing. Unfortunately, many times 
these decisions are made without consideration of the underlying risks to critical 
information, infrastructure, and/or resources. 
With increasing focus in the Air Force on quick, useful and accurate information, 
the GeoBase concept of “One Installation, One Map” has quickly emerged to provide an 
integrated common installation picture (CIP) to decision makers.  As advancements in 
information technology continue to develop, so increases the ability to store, manage and 
integrate larger amounts of data.  As problems of limited resources of time, money, and 
manpower continue to preoccupy organizations, technological advancements such as 
Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and the internet have made it easier and more 
affordable to share information once considered unthinkable, allowing complex decisions 
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to be made with a more efficient use of resources and at a higher confidence.   However, 
the same information technologies that allow those that need the information to 
accomplish their mission also may provide sensitive information to people with different 
agendas.  Concerns continue to grow as the geospatial infrastructure makes it easier to 
incorporate sensitive information such as the USAF mission data sets (MDS) and 
regional information picture (RIP) information.  The balance between information 
assurance and information sharing is delicate and the community is still sorting out the 
best ways to maximize security while encouraging users to share information in order to 
provide the widest benefits to the customers and the mission. 
 
Motivations for Research 
Motivations for this research stems from the researcher’s personal interest in the 
GeoBase program.  Having served in a command which embraced the technology early 
and instilled at the lowest levels the concepts, potential, and power of GeoBase, the 
researcher  was among the first to help implement and shape the base-level GeoBase 
concepts in Alaska.  During the initial implementation new questions were raised about 
the existing business practices about sharing these detailed installation maps.  These 
issues became even more prominent in experiences in Korea, working with multiple 
agencies with high turn over rates.  Information sharing was essential, yet often requires 
access across multiple disclosure levels such as for official use only (FOUO), secret (US 
only), and secret (releasable to Republic of Korea, RELROK).  The struggle to utilize all 
available information while maintaining appropriate levels of classification became a 
challenge.  Merging information to provide a better decision picture is necessary; 
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however, concerns abound about giving information to contractors or other outside 
requestors.  Those challenging questions are the essence of this research.   
Information sharing is essential, yet is hastened by the required multiple levels of 
disclosure.  With the increasing amounts of geospatial information our military has been 
producing, one of the biggest challenges is ensuring that sensitive information is secure 
for its intended purposes.  As users of the data, we are awed by its availability and 
demand quicker, more reliable, accurate, access.  In the eagerness to see the potential for 
good, we do not always necessarily weigh the potential for bad.   
 
 
Targeted Research Area 
 
The targeted areas for this research is to review what is known about information 
security, risk management, and current USAF policies and guidance applied to geospatial 
information found within the USAF GeoBase program as denoted in Figure 1 below.  A 
focus of this research  is to also examine the progress that has been made in efforts to 
secure GeoBase’s geospatial information in order to better map out what will be needed 











Figure 1.  Targeted Area of Research 
 
Research Goals 
The overall research goal is to improve the general understanding of importance 
of balance between securing and sharing information in order to maximize USAF mission 
processes and minimize customer inefficiencies.  By learning what works well and what 
does not work well from existing guidance and current problems, we can begin to see 
areas rich for improvement.  As resources become increasingly limited, it becomes more 
important to secure and share them.   Understanding the nature of the security risks posed 
by GeoBase the Air Force will be better equipped to balance the scales of information 
security and information sharing.   
  
Overall Approach to Research 
The overall approach to this research is to start with the motivations for research 
and develop primary research questions that relate to specific focused objectives which 
more broadly describe the intent of what is to be accomplished.  Once the questions and 
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objectives are defined, then two types of literature reviews will be accomplished.  The 
first literature review will cast a wide net to learn as much as possible about the topic of 
geospatial information, security and information sharing as well as subjects that touch or 
impact the topic of the thesis.  These key concepts include, but are not limited to: 
 
• USAF GeoBase Program 
• Geospatial Information Systems 
(GIS) 
• Information Security 
• Information Assurance 
• Information Sharing 
• Critical Information 
• Data-sharing policies 
• Data Stewardship 
• Risk Management 
• Security Measures 
• Sensitive / Critical data access 
controls 
• Data protection 
• Digital terrorism 
• Digital Rights Management 
• Information Life Cycle 
• Vulnerability Studies 
• Terrorism, Information 
Technology, and Vulnerability 
• Knowledge Management 
• National Map Efforts 
• Global Information Grid (GIG) 
• Freedom of Information Act 
• User Rights and Privileges 
• Internet Map Servers (IMS) 
• Data Integration (Security) 
• DoD Information Policies 




The second literature review will be geared towards the research methodology and 
trying to discover the best way to find the answers we are seeking.  Understanding the 
pitfalls and possibilities of certain types of research methodologies will help to target the 
right tools to accomplish this complicated task.  We will learn more about why the 
exploratory case study was chosen in the context of our understanding about this topic and 
where the GeoBase program office is in its current life cycle and why an exploratory look 
is needed.  Other considerations for choosing this type of research methodology were the 
researcher’s background and interest, the audience, the limited available literature, and the 
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amount of time available for this study.  These decision criteria strongly favor this type of 
qualitative approach.  The difficult part, which encompasses chapters three and four, will 
be in developing the framework on how to collect and analyze information.   The 
conclusions drawn from this framework will help provide answers to our questions so that 
we may begin applying this new knowledge in our decisions for the future.  Figure 2 below 
provides a graphical view of this approach to research and will serve as the road map for 
this research effort (see also Appendix A). 
 
Motivations for Research
1. Improve systemic security design and 
confidence in sharing information across 
geospatial information systems (GIS).
2. Provide better understanding of what is 
“appropriate access” to geospatial 
information
3. To strengthen future policies and 
guidance to better safeguard information 
while providing wider benefits to the 
customer and the mission.
tivati s f r esearc
1. I prove syste ic security design and 
confidence in sharing infor ation across 
geospatial infor ation syste s ( IS).
2. Provide better understanding of hat is 
“appropriate access” to geospatial 
infor ation
3. To strengthen future policies and 
guidance to better safeguard infor ation 
hile providing ider benefits to the 
custo er and the ission.
Focused Objectives 
1. To develop a set of general themes and characterizations relating to the 
security of information into integrated geospatial information systems (GIS) 
2. To determine the general themes and characterizations of information sharing
on geospatial information, specifically GeoBase.
3. Assess the availability of USAF GeoBase information (CIP, RIP, and MDS).
4. To develop a conceptual framework capturing the impact of information 
sharing and security concerns on geospatial datasets within military 
installations (USAF GeoBase). 
5. To use an exploratory case study methodology to determine understanding of 
current organizational procedures and identify potential areas for 
improvement.
6. Determine organizational abilities to implement the current guidelines or 
recommended actions to coordinate data restrictions and data requests.
7. Develop / advocate a measurement tool to evaluate the maturity of an 
organization’s GeoBase program and policies/practices to ensure maximum 
security and user potential.
c se  jectives 
1. To develop a set of general the es and characterizations relating to the 
security of infor ation into integrated geospatial infor ation syste s ( IS) 
2. To deter ine the general the es and characterizations of infor ation sharing
on geospatial infor ation, specifically eoBase.
3. Assess the availability of SAF eoBase infor ation ( IP, IP, and S).
4. To develop a conceptual fra e ork capturing the i pact of infor ation 
sharing and security concerns on geospatial datasets ithin ilitary 
installations ( SAF eoBase). 
5. To use an exploratory case study ethodology to deter ine understanding of 
current organizational procedures and identify potential areas for 
i prove ent.
6. eter ine organizational abilities to i ple ent the current guidelines or 
reco ended actions to coordinate data restrictions and data requests.
7. evelop / advocate a easure ent tool to evaluate the aturity of an 
organization’s eoBase progra  and policies/practices to ensure axi u  
security and user potential.
Literature Review
1. What is the current GeoBase policy and 
guidance on securing and sharing 
information?  (What are the standard guidelines 
for releasing / publishing data our Airmen should be 
following?)
2. With whom is information shared and who are 
the GeoBase information customers?
3. Explore definitions, constructs, concepts, 
frameworks, and models in related fields of 
interest, such as:
iterat re evie
1. hat is the current eoBase policy and 
guidance on securing and sharing 
infor ation?  ( hat are the standard guidelines 
for releasing / publishing data our Air en should be 
following?)
2. ith ho  is infor ation shared and ho are 
the eoBase infor ation custo ers?
3. Explore definitions, constructs, concepts, 


















(Synthesize Information in Literature Review)
 












• Sensitive / Critical data access controls
• Data protection
• Digital terrorism
• Digital Rights Management
• Information Life Cycle
• Vulnerability Studies





1. Exploratory Case Study
This is also a descriptive case study 
but is aimed at generating 
hypotheses for later investigation 
rather than illustrating. (GAO, 1990)
Its function is to develop the 
evaluation questions, measures, 
designs, and analytic strategy for the 
bigger study. (GAO, 1990, pg 40)
Exploration begins with some sort of 
rationale and direction, even if later 
proven wrong (Yin, 2003, pg 23).
et l y 
iterat re evie
1. Exploratory ase Study
This is also a descriptive case study 
but is ai ed at generating 
hypotheses for later investigation 
rather than illustrating. (GAO, 1990)
Its function is to develop the 
evaluation questions, easures, 
designs, and analytic strategy for the 
bigger study. (GAO, 1990, pg 40)
Exploration begins with so e sort of 
rationale and direction, even if later 
proven wrong (Yin, 2003, pg 23).
Approach to Research Overview
Limitationsi itati sRecommendations for 
Future Research
TBD












1. What is the nature of the security risk 
posed by GeoBase?
2. What information is sensitive that poses a 
risk to security?
3. What impacts might information security 
concerns affect information sharing.
4. What are the key information system 
security constructs and their 
interrelationships?
5. What are the costs and benefits of either 
limiting or providing access to the data?  
Do they outweigh the risks?
ri ary esearc  esti s
1. hat is the nature of the security risk 
posed by eoBase?
2. hat infor ation is sensitive that poses a 
risk to security?
3. hat i pacts ight infor ation security 
concerns affect infor ation sharing.
4. hat are the key infor ation syste  
security constructs and their 
interrelationships?
5. hat are the costs and benefits of either 
li iting or providing access to the data?  
o they out eigh the risks?
Improve the general understanding of importance of 










Primary Research Questions 
Six primary research questions, listed below in Table 1, support and strengthen this 
overall research goal and form the primary goals (PG) of this research.   
 






PG1 What is the nature of the security risk posed by GeoBase?  
PG2 What information is sensitive that poses a risk to security?  
PG3 








What are the impacts of information security on information sharing 
within the GeoBase community? 
 
PG6 
What are the costs and benefits of either limiting or providing access to 




The following seven focused objectives (FO), in Table 2, help to concentrate on how the 
primary research questions and the potential benefits of the research come together.  These 
help to give a better idea of the direction and actions that this research will strive to 
















(see Table 1.3) 
FO1 
To develop a set of general themes and 
characterizations relating to the sharing of 
information and relative security concerns into 
integrated geospatial information systems (GIS)  
PG1 PB1, PB2, PB3, 
PB5 
FO2 
To determine the general themes and 
characterizations of information sharing and 
security on geospatial information security 
concerns relating to the impacts of geospatial 
information, specifically GeoBase mission data 
sets (MDS). 
PG2 PB1, PB2, PB4, 
PB5 
FO3 
Assess the availability of USAF GeoBase 
information (CIP, RIP, and MDS). 
 
PG1, PG2 PB1, PB2, PB3, 
PB4, PB5 
FO4 
To develop a conceptual framework capturing the 
impact of information sharing and security 
concerns on geospatial datasets within military 
installations (USAF GeoBase).  
 
PG1, PG2 PB3, PB4, PB5 
FO5 
To use an exploratory case study methodology to 
determine understanding of current organizational 
procedures and identify potential areas for 
improvement.  
PG1, PG2 PB1, PB2, PB3, 
PB4 
FO6 
Determine organizational abilities to implement 
the current guidelines or recommended actions to 
coordinate data restrictions and data requests. 
PG1, PG2 PB1, PB2, PB3, 
PB4 
FO7 
Develop / advocate a measurement tool to 
evaluate the maturity of an organization’s 
GeoBase program and policies/practices to ensure 
maximum security and user potential. 
PG1, PG2 PB1, PB2, PB3, 
PB4 
 
Benefits / Implications of Research 
 
This research will provide insight as to issues associated with the accuracy, access, 
and availability of geospatial information.  These insights into the current challenges of 
information security and information sharing that the GeoBase program faces help to 
provide a more accurate target for the implementation of new policies and guidance, 
measures of control, or reengineering efforts of existing business processes.   Table 3, 









PB1 Identify needs and priorities for future investigation 
PB2 Provide background research for the development of evaluation questions or measurement strategy (metrics) 
PB3 Strengthen future information security / assurance policies 
PB4 Improve confidence in system = willingness to share more information 
PB5 More shared information = wider benefits to customers and mission 





This thesis includes five chapters and supporting information found in the 
appendices. This first chapter has provided an introduction and overview to the research 
questions.  The second chapter will provide a more detailed review of the existing literature 
and begins to examine the context of what geospatial information is, introduce the Air 
Force’s GeoBase program, and discuss problems, policies, risks, challenges, and touch on 
some of the recommended solutions and current control measures.  Chapter 3 will then 
discuss the research strategy and why the exploratory case study methodology was 
selected, evaluate potential pitfalls to research, and explain how this case study was 
designed.  Chapter 4 will then begin analyzing the case database, populated by sources of 
evidence and investigative protocol discussed in the case study design section of chapter 
three to answer the primary research questions.  Chapter 5 will include further discussion 
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and recommendations along with possible limitations and future research ideas.  Readers 
can find additional supporting information for this research in the back of this report under 







The literature review contains detailed information on topics that are relevant to this 
research effort.  This chapter will introduce information security, explain what geospatial 
information is, give a brief history of the GeoBase program; the emergence of geospatial 
technologies; the new paradigms, problems, and policies that have materialized; and 
provide a comprehensive review of the most recent information security and information 
sharing literature.  
What is Information Security? 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), define information security as that which “protects 
information from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimize 
business damage and maximize return on investments and business opportunities” 
(ISO/IEC 17799, 2000).  Since information is a valuable asset, particularly in a national 
security and military environment, it must be protected.  “Information can exist in many 
forms. It can be printed or written on paper, stored electronically, transmitted by post or 
using electronic means, shown on films, or spoken in conversation. Whatever form the 
information takes, or means by which it is shared or stored, it should always be 
appropriately protected” (ISO/IEC 17799, 2000).  This research will later discuss the 
different controls that can and are being implemented to achieve information security in the 
GeoBase program.  We will explore the different policies, practices, procedures, 
organizational structures and software functions established to ensure that the specific 
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security objectives of the GeoBase program are met.  (ISO/IEC 17799, 2000).  This 
research will explore these forms as they relate to geospatial information.   
What is Geospatial Information? 
 Geospatial information can be defined as any information that identifies the 
geographic location and characteristics of both natural and man-made earth-bound features. 
(Zettler, 2002). The types of geospatial information range from specific latitude and 
longitude coordinates to a general description of where something is located. These can 
take on the form of maps, overhead images, datasets, websites, addresses (Baker et al, 
2004). “Geographic location is a key feature of 80-90% of all governmental data (Federal 
Geographic Data Committee, 2005).  The Air Force has begun to use geospatial 
information to manage their installation infrastructure assets, for example, the locations of 
power distribution, water, sewer, telecommunications, and roads are stored within a 
database. Although geospatial information is diverse, it is still information, which is why it 
is important to understand the laws and policies that form the basis for rule sets used for 
managing both geospatial and non-geospatial information (Cullis, 2004).  
 
GeoBase History 
The art of mapping has not changed much over the centuries, but the understanding 
of the world, new tools, and improved technologies have enabled us to communicate better 
and know more about the environment that have served as the catalyst for the evolution of 
mapping.  The most recent advances in technology and policy have culminated in 
innovative ways in which the U.S. Air Force approaches the process of mapping 
installations.  These new applied technologies have enabled more informed decisions 
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through the comprehensive new mapping and information strategy for the USAF known as 
GeoBase.  “The GeoBase program, officially launched in the summer of 2001 by the Air 
Force Civil Engineer, has transformed the traditional surveying and mapping process into 
an invaluable information resource for the larger installation mission, both at the home 
station and in the deployed environment” (Cullis and Tinsley, 2004). 
GeoBase was the result of a structural, strategic, and tactical improvement.  At the 
heart of this massive new reengineering effort was the customer. 
 
“To realize the full benefits of the knowledge revolution, the geospatial 
information user community must redesign and improve how it does its business.  
This will require significant changes in culture, organization, education, and 
processes.  For example, the geospatial information technology professional must 
become a full partner with the customer in defining operational needs for 
information, and exploring promising new technologies.”  
 
- 3 CES Geospatial Information System Strategic Plan, 1999 
 
Although GeoBase was not directly touted directly as a reengineering effort, it 
certainly can be classified as one as it held central to its mission and the end user 
(customer).  This thesis will in part examine why a complete reengineering approach was 
needed, how the Air Force was able to successfully incorporate change in a culture steeped 
in resistance, as well as what some of the challenges management faced in making such a 
radical shift in the way in which bases are mapped and information is provided. 
Just because converting bases over to GIS had not worked, it did not mean it was 
not the right strategy for the Air Force.  By the late 1990s, several things had changed.  
Technology had advanced addressing previous customer concerns and was becoming much 
more affordable.  Leaders throughout the different commands emerged; in particular, a 
leader emerged who understood what GIS could do for the Air Force and its mission.  
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Additionally, this person understood the need for paradigm shift in the way the Air Force 
executes its mapping business.  In the fall of 1998, Colonel Brian J. Cullis coined the term 
“GeoBase” and had a clear vision of what the future could be and was well prepared to 
accept the challenge of being a change agent.  One of the first things that was needed was 
to clearly separate the negative reputation that GIS was receiving due to the previous failed 
management attempts.  The distinguishing new GeoBase concept was something new, it 
carried with it a clear vision and well developed plan for implementation.  This new vision, 
“One Installation…One Map”, required a complete redesign of the way business was done.  
Implementation Plans were customized to each installation to help them traverse the path of 
change.  The art of communication, education and persuasion were essential in helping the 
highest-ranking General to the newest Airman understand why there was a need for change 
and what they could do to help enable the required reengineering efforts. 
From the beginning, it was clearly articulated that GeoBase is not a system, 
package, program, button, or particular software application, but rather a process or a 
complete integration effort.  In essence, it was to be a new way of thinking about the data 
we use and collect.  This new way of thinking included a way to use maps to display and 
integrate data, leveraging the best available commercial off-the-shelf GIS and GPS 
technologies to produce a composite Common Installation Picture (CIP).  The CIP serves 
as the one picture portraying different databases across multiple functions.  The concept of 
“One Installation…One Map” enables existing stovepipes to begin cross ventilating 




Emerging Geospatial Technologies 
 
In the mid 1980s and early 90s the Air Force began adopting different types of 
information technology to aid in the drafting and design of construction projects and base 
maps.  Computer Aided Design and Drafting (CADD) is an enabling technology solution 
that helped address some of the initial problems of drafting by hand.  Just as the 
organizations were determining the possibilities of having a digital CADD map, 
innovations in technology were being made in quantum leaps.  Innovations such as Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS), affordable handheld GPS receivers, aerial and commercial 
satellite imagery, and Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) began opening the doors to 
new possibilities in the world of mapping.  
 
A New Paradigm 
The Air Force has made changes through the years from hand-drafted maps to 
computer-aided drafting, to today’s revolution in utilizing Geospatial Information Systems 
(GIS) in the reengineered efforts of military mapping and decision-making.   
 
“For the past three years, I’ve been immersed in managing change—change 
in how we employ geospatial information technologies to best support the 
defense installation mission. There is much written about the difficulties of 
leading change across large organizations with their many parochial 
interests. However, I have discovered that if you focus on what these 
disparate organizations have in common, such as the need for a map, it is 
much easier to achieve a broad consensus for change. And whether it’s the 
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young engineer assistant in the utilities shop at an Air Force base or an 
undersecretary of defense at the Pentagon, they are all eager and willing to 
learn of practical ways to employ geospatial technologies to perform their 
assigned missions more effectively” (Fuhr, 2004). 
 
Col Brian Cullis 
Executive Manager, Defense 




It is due to the understanding of the customer needs and mission requirements, and 
the culture for change, which allowed the Air Force to embark on a reengineering to make 
such substantial improvements in their processes.  As an organization, the Air Force must 
continue to seek improvements and maintain vigilance of its customers, competition, and 
be willing to change in order to stay on top. 
 
New Paradigms, New Problems 
The Air Force’s mission has been defining its direction since its inception in 1947.  
In December 2005, Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne and Air Force Chief of 
Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley issued a joint Letter to Airmen stating, "Today, our world is 
fast paced, constantly shifting, and filled with a wide range of challenges. Our mission is 
our guiding compass, and now more than ever we need it to be clear and precise.  
Therefore, we have rewritten the Air Force’s mission statement to define where and what 
we do...The mission of the United States Air Force is to deliver sovereign options for the 
 
 13
defense of the United States of America and its global interests -- to fly and fight in Air, 
Space, and Cyberspace.” (Moseley and Wayne, 2005). 
 The new mission includes two new concepts, “sovereign options” and 
“cyberspace”.  The incorporation of cyberspace into the mission recognizes the importance 
of information security and information sharing.  In the new world of cyberspace, 
geospatial data makes up approximately one-half of the nation’s domestic economic 
activities and provides the edge in international competitiveness (Cullis, 2004).  Once made 
strong by abundant natural resources and industrial revolution, countries and businesses are 
finding power in a new information revolution.  For the military, international 
competitiveness is the ability to fly, flight, and win.  As industrial resources become more 
readily available and begin to equalize the playing field, today’s world competitors seek to 
differentiate themselves through their abilities to manage information and knowledge.  The 
demand for information and knowledge drives the need for new data.  As the data and the 
dependency on data continue to increase, new problems and demands arise.  In 2005, a 
survey of the metadata in the nation’s geospatial depository, Geospatial One-Stop, shows 





Figure 3.  Top Geospatial Data Producers (Federal Geographic Data Committee, 2006) 
 
Within the federal government, the Department of the Interior is the largest producer of 
geospatial data, as shown in Figure 4.  The Department of Defense has invested heavily in 
information systems over the last few years and is producing a significant amount of 





Figure 4.  Federal Agencies Producing Geospatial Data (Federal Geographic Data 
Committee, 11 Aug 2006) 
 
 
Geospatial information has continued to increase exponentially, as seen over the past ten 









As geospatial information systems have been rapidly expanding in the civilian 
sector, the USAF GeoBase program has witnessed tremendous growth as the need for 
minimizing fiscal waste and maximizing decision power has grown. This growth stemmed 
from the Air Force Civil Engineering (CE) community, whose need to provide accuracy, 
access, and accountability of installation assets drove an investment in the required 
equipment, skills, and additional data to form the geospatial information infrastructure 
called GeoBase. 
 
Additional evidence of the expansion of geospatial information can be seen in the 
formation of the Defense Installation Spatial Data Infrastructure (DISDI) program in late 
2004. This program was set up in the fall of 2004 to “organize the broad geospatial data 
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investments found across the business mission area of the DoD’s Global Information Grid.” 
(B. J. Cullis, Jul 26, 2005). DISDI’s successes in helping to provide focus to the entire DoD 
came as a result of seeing the need to reign in individual IT efforts across its massive 
organization. “DISDI is described today as a DoD mission capability comprised of those 
people, policies and practices necessary to acquire, steward and share “best available” 
installation and environmental geospatial data assets across the Global Information Grid—a 
system to provide users a seamless, secure, and interconnected information environment, 
for the real-time and near real-time needs of both the warfighter and the business user” (B. 
J. Cullis, Jul 26, 2005). Through the collected efforts of DISDI and GIS communities, a 
common direction and enterprise solution was adopted. Today, there is an establishment of 
not only the Air Force’s GeoBase program, but also DoD GIS efforts that include the 
Navy’s GeoReadiness, the Marines’ GeoFidelis, and the Army’s GIS-R, which is the 
Army’s Installation Geographic Information & Services (IGI&S) program office. The 
expansion of program offices and mission related applications just within the last five years 
shows the need for accurate geospatial information technologies that provide critical 
information which enables decision makers, supports war fighters, aids planners, and 
increases overall situational awareness.   
 
 
New Problems, New Policies 
As new technologies emerged, government began to quickly feel the need to set 
policies and procedures to govern the use and application of the emergent technologies.  
Mapping efforts were becoming a more collaborative effort and needed cohesive 
management practices due to individual bases developing best practices.  The problem 
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escalates when Airman Jones PCSs (changes duty assignments) and had been trained a 
certain way to accomplish the job and when in a new environment she must be retrained.  
The cost to retrain and relearn skills from one base to another was adding undue stress to an 
increasingly lean organization.  Therefore, in the interest of finite resources a lowest 
common denominator approach became the applied practice, which did not warrant 
government funding or training. 
New trepidations arose as the GeoBase program was implemented throughout the 
major commands.  The same information technologies that allow those that need the 
information to accomplish their mission also may provide sensitive information to people 
with different agendas.  Concerns continue to grow as the geospatial infrastructure makes it 
easier to incorporate sensitive information such as the USAF mission data sets (MDS) and 
regional information picture (RIP) information.  The balance between information 
assurance and information sharing is delicate and the community is still sorting out the best 
ways to maximize security while encouraging users to share information in order to provide 




 No one event helped solidify those fears more than the September 11 2001 attacks.  
“After terrorists attacked the Pentagon and World Trade Center buildings, most 
governmental agencies hastily withheld map data and other records from the public, thus 
curtailing citizens’ ability to inform themselves” (Tombs, 2005).  New requirements and 
guidance were needed for the management of data and federal information assets that relate 
to geographic locations.  Some agencies do not recognize that geospatial data is public 
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record.  “Legal cases at both the federal and state levels have nearly ended that assertion, 
which is now codified by many state public records acts and FOIA (Freedom of 
Information Act)” (Tombs, 2005).  It has taken three years for the different arms of the 
government to publish Guidelines for Providing Appropriate Access to Geospatial Data in 
Response to Homeland Security Concerns (Federal Geographic Data Committee, Jun 
2005).   
The challenge now is defining the legal guidelines for what is “sensitive 
information”.  Sensitive information has been defined as “Information that requires 
protection due to the risk and magnitude of loss or harm that could result from inadvertent 
or deliberate disclosure, alteration, or destruction of the information. The term includes 
information whose improper use or disclosure could adversely affect the ability of an 
agency to accomplish its mission, proprietary information, records about individuals 
requiring protection under the Privacy Act, and information not releasable under the 
Freedom of Information Act.”  (Swanson, Hash, Wilson, and Kissel, 2005:C-10).  In times 
of fear, such as during the war on terrorism, new emphasis has been placed “on undefined 
‘potential’ and ‘possible’ risks to ‘sensitive’ or ‘critical infrastructure’ in prohibiting public 
spatial data access.  While deliberating what records are ‘sensitive’ and ‘who’ should be 
prohibited access, records custodians are improperly using the ‘homeland security’ excuse 
to ignore records access laws”  (Tombs, 2005).   
 Prior to 9/11, many of these concerns had never come into question.  New laws 
continue to influence the evolution of how managing and protecting information, to include 
the Air Force’s GeoBase data for its installations and expeditionary sites.  The Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 and the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 
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brought new definitions affecting information systems and security.  Information security is 
defined in public law as: 
 
“…protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide: integrity, 
which means guarding against improper information modification or destruction, 
and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity; confidentiality, 
which means preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including 
means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; and availability, 
which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.” - 
Federal Information Security Management Act – Public Law 107-347. 
 
 
It is interesting in looking at the timeline of laws passed to see how definitions have 
changed over the years and are reflective of the major concerns and events of history, see 
Appendix E.  Ultimately, we are all affected by the courts decisions.  Appendix F offers a 
history of policy and guidance that has directly shaped and impacted the implementation 
and development of the USAF GeoBase program.     
As the development of new technologies and concern for how those technologies 
are applied develop, so expands the social and legal structures within which they exist.  
This work will explore the supporting legal structures that attempts to set the boundaries 
for society to ultimately insure the safety and security of its citizens by looking at the laws 
and policies that affect the existence of the USAF GeoBase program. 
 
Geospatial Information and the Law 
As early as 1950, the federal government recognized the importance of managing 
information and established the Federal Records Act of 1950 which appointed the National 
Archives and Records Administration (NARA) as the primary agency responsible for 
management and oversight which cultivated the framework for records management 
 
 21
programs for all federal agencies.  The importance of ensuring that nationally important 
transactions are recorded and safeguarded against loss remains a constant even as the 
government shifts from paper to e-government.  Federal laws and regulations have helped 
establish common good practices for creating, using, and maintaining information that may 
be useful in making future decisions.  As technology grows, so has the capability to store, 
maintain, and share information.  One of the major concerns rising from the amassing of 
information was privacy.  In 1974, the Privacy Act was established to regulate the 
“collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by federal 
executive branch agencies and generally characterized as a “code of fair information 
practices” (United States Department of Justice, 2004).  However, the Act's ill-defined 
language limited legislative case law history and made it difficult to interpret and apply.  
This is particularly notable as the laws are beginning to catch up with the capabilities of 
new information technologies and new systems, with particular interest in the growing 
utilization of geospatial information systems (GIS).   
As the need to find more efficient ways to do business and manage increasing 
resources, the legislature passed new public laws to herd agencies into being more publicly 
accountable for reducing the mounting burdens of required paperwork and red tape.  In 
1995, Public Law 104-12, the Paperwork Reduction Act was signed, which eventually lead 
to the Government Paperwork Elimination Act in 1999.  The Paperwork Elimination Act 
was monumental as the first law to establish guidance for the use of electronic signature 
technology, requiring “when practicable, Federal agencies use electronic forms, electronic 
filing, and electronic signatures to conduct official business with the public by 2003. In 
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doing this, agencies will create records with business, legal and, in some cases, historical 
value” (National Archives and Records Administration, 2000).   
 As agencies received guidance from their governing bodies, many organizations, 
including the Air Force began to realize the opportunities these laws created in fulfilling 
goals and requirements to eliminate waste and increase efficiency.  As the government has 
spent over $27.9 billion on information technology annually, laws have been passed to help 
ensure that departments are making sound investment decisions which effectively align IT 
projects with their business planning and measurement processes.  The Clinger-Cohen Act 
(CCA) of 1996 “provides that the government information technology shop be operated 
exactly as an efficient and profitable business would be operated. Acquisition, planning and 
management of technology must be treated as a "capital investment." While the law is 
complex, all consumers of hardware and software in the Department should be aware of the 
Chief Information Officer's leadership in implementing this statute” (United States 
Department of Education, 2004).  These new laws set the new standards forcing 
organizations to develop and organize information management capabilities to meet the 
different missions of government agencies.  
As the Air Force found new uses for the GPS and GIS technologies and the 
GeoBase program emerged, these laws laid the groundwork for putting into perspective the 
need for change.  GeoBase was the product of the combination of these laws, policies, and 
executive directives that has now helped to organize and streamline geospatial information 
into a powerful situational awareness and decision maker’s tool. 
Soon, Geospatial Information System Strategic Plans began to emerge which 
reflected new priorities and attitudes within government.  Each plan was custom tailored to 
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each base and designed to conform to multiple governmental directives such as the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), and 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) mandates and guidelines.  “These bodies of 
laws and regulations created the opportunity to move from budget and acquisition centric 
decision making to mission, architecture, service, and performance decision making” (Geo 
InSight International, Inc., 1999).  In 1996, the Information Technology (IT) Management 
Reform Act was passed, which required federal agencies, including DoD, to identify a 
Chief Information Officer (CIO) and regulate IT investments.  This was the first time 
“organizations were now required to strategically plan IT purchases and link them to 
specific mission goals” (Cullis and Tinsley, 2004).  
Geospatial information offers new and exciting opportunities in expanding fields of 
interest.  Accuracy, access, and accountability are the demands of the future and many 
different points of view will drive the need for the future legal clarifications and guidance  
(Schomper & et al, 1996).  Examples of debates over geospatial information today include, 
personal privacy, sensitive vs. classified information, and liability on information provided, 
need for shared information (such as emergency responders and environmental care takers).  
GIS analysts and technicians continue to discover new applications and resume aggregating 
once lonely islands of information with the powerful bridging tools that geographic 
information systems provide.   
These new applications of technology in to the GeoBase concept help to broaden 
our knowledge and expanding our capabilities.  With new capabilities come new 
responsibilities.  Future laws, policies and procedures will help information users and data 
stewards to continue to weight the fine balancing act of the need for national information 
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security and information sharing in an increasingly demanding environment for accuracy, 
access, and accountability. 
 
Identifying Security Risks 
As the military seeks to make more informed decisions based on information from 
geospatially related data, there are increasing concerns that this reliance may be exploited. 
To better understand the risk, the threats and vulnerabilities to the system must be 
understood. Solomon and Chapple define a vulnerability as “a weakness in a system that 
may be exploited to degrade or bypass standard security mechanisms” and a threat as “a set 
of external circumstances that allow a vulnerability to be exploited” (Solomon and 
Chapple, 2005).  When vulnerabilities and threats overlap, this relationship defines what 




Figure 6.  Identifying Risks (Solomon and Chapple, 2005) 
 
 
There are a wide variety of common computer threats from viruses, worms, Trojan 
horses, port scanning, file share attacks, Operating System (OS) attacks, scams, spamming, 
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phishing, denial of services attacks, password guessing, backdoors, sweepers, sniffers, 
packet forge spoofing, IP spoofing, to the most obscure such as social engineering (Speed, 
Ellis, & Korper, 2002).  However, concerns regarding the interception of data, theft / 
release of sensitive or confidential information, unauthorized access to privileged 
information, theft of other computer hardware or devices, system penetration by an 
outsider, laptop and hand held computer thefts, computer system and network abuse, and 
sabotage of sabotage of data or networks are also among the top breaches of security 
(Australian Institute of Criminology 2006, 2006).  Among these real threats, the greatest 
risk to the security policies is not the physical network, but rather the accountability of the 
people within the organization. By far, our human nature is our greatest danger. However, 
we can help mitigate this threat by physically designing the network to be safer, educating 
our airmen and enforcing the standards set out by the security policies and defined by 
routinely conducted vulnerability assessments. 
 
The Air Force must also consider the physical security of the system itself, the 
management of the database and its integrity, as well as the type and scope of access to the 
database. Protection of the availability of services and information is important to ensuring 
that users have access to the information when it is needed. The issue that geospatial 
information is available publicly is not the only security risk, in 2000 there were a reported 
25,000 attempted intrusions into the defense system. Of those attacks, 245 of them were 
successful.  Of this less than 1% of successful attacks, 96% of those were found to be 
preventable if users had followed established protocols (Onley, 25 April 2004).  The 
network security on which the GeoBase data relies is heavily monitored and network 
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personnel continue to strive to improve network security by limiting the access to the 
system and implementing policies such as mandating firewall protection, confidential user 
accounts and passwords, no shared accounts, password-protections, locating computers and 
servers in a physically secure environment, establishing file permissions and user rights on 
certain files and folders, and separating classified information on separate systems. Beyond 
the security of the network, let us discuss the primary issues that are more closely related to 
the risks of geospatial information and the capabilities that these systems provide. 
 
 Only recently has public access to information become a perceived concern 
(Tombs, 2005).  Following the attacks on 9/11, almost overnight, federal officials became 
worried that some public information is now too public and “agencies cut off access to 
thousands of documents on the Internet, ordered certain information in government 
libraries to be withheld or even destroyed, and simply stopped providing some information 
that used to be routinely released to the public” (Matthews, 2002).  The concerns over 
providing a terrorist access to information that would help him develop or use a weapon of 
mass destruction lies at the heart of our fears. “Thus, digital maps are no longer available 
online from the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, a CD-ROM containing 
information on the nation's water supplies was ordered destroyed at depository libraries, 
and tens of thousands of documents vanished from government Web sites. The information 
clampdown has touched off a sprawling debate over how much information should be — 
and legally can be — withheld from the public” (Matthews, 2002).  Soon after, the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), now the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency (NGA), asked the RAND Corporation to assist in developing a framework to 
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assess the security implications of publicly available geospatial information. This study 
remains among the few to address these specific types of implications and provides a broad 
base for future research. Their studies began to put into perspective the scope of federal 
geospatial information, finding it to be widespread across “465 programs, offices, or major 
initiatives at 30 different federal agencies and departments that make various types of 
geospatial information publicly accessible” (Baker et al, 2004).  RAND concluded that 
very few (6% of the 629 datasets studied) appeared to be capable of fulfilling possible 
terrorist’s needs. Even fewer sites (less than 1%) were found to provide critical 
information, both useful and unique, by their definition to potential terrorists. They also 
noted that in so many cases, since geospatial information exists in numerous ways, 
alternate forms of the same information existed readily in the public domain, beyond the 
control of federal sources” (Baker et al, 2004). 
 
The level of risk that we are willing to take hinges on the values that we place on 
the following three strategic factors of information: data accuracy, access, and 
accountability (Schomper et al, 1996).  Evaluating the impacts of not having accurate 
information, timely access to it when needed, or responsible ways of accounting for the 
demands of information will help in the understanding of the risks that are willing to 
accept.   This game of risk is one of compromise.  
 
Top Challenges 
The goal of reducing the security risks and increasing the range of access across 
communities and knowledge seekers is not sought without challenge. The primary 
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challenges discussed in this section are not unique to only the GeoBase program, but are 
challenges that leaders in information management face when dealing with information 
security and information sharing. The first hurdle that must be overcome is in how we 
define, or do not define, the sensitivity of information. We will look at issues surrounding 
the classification of information, sharing information, and the inconsistencies of policies 
and guidance and see how these add to the top challenges of creating a defensible 
geospatial information strategy. 
 
 
Defining the Sensitivity of Information 
 
Among the top challenges in the balance of information security and information 
sharing is defining the sensitivity of information. In times of fear, such as during the war on 
terrorism, new emphasis has been placed “on undefined ‘potential’ and ‘possible’ risks to 
‘sensitive’ or ‘critical infrastructure’ in prohibiting public spatial data access. While 
deliberating what records are ‘sensitive’ and ‘who’ should be prohibited access, records 
custodians are improperly using the ‘homeland security’ excuse to ignore records access 
laws” (Tombs, 2005).  Concerns over how the government chooses to define "sensitive but 
unclassified" information fuel hesitation to share information. Government watchdogs fear 
that a new sensitive information category could give agencies a way to hide embarrassing 
information from public scrutiny (Matthews, 2002).  There are so many factors to be 
considered when deriving a definition of sensitive information. Even if something is 
considered “sensitive”, geospatial data has a tendency to change over time. As the 
environment and value of the information changes, so do the risks to security. It is not 
viable to make one decision in the lifespan of the data, but a constant litmus test must be 
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made which can alter the decisions about access. These decisions affect not only the 
originating organization, but also the entire chain of users both up and down the 
information stream (Federal Geographic Data Committee, 2005). 
The classification of data has been the most effective way to manage the differences 
in the level of risk that certain data bears.  Once the challenge of identifying what 
information is sensitive, there becomes multiple challenges in applying a designation to 
information. Overprotecting data severely hinders users that depend on using that 
information on a day-to-day basis in doing their job and accomplishing the mission. 
Restricting information has tremendous costs, in not only the added time and maintenance 
costs that it takes to manage that information, but also the expanded personnel safety risks. 
For example, consider electrical or natural gas distribution lines that are part of the critical 
infrastructure of an installation.  If these distribution lines are classified as “SECRET”, it 
would result in a  tremendous impact on the electricians and utility personnel responsible 
for maintaining those lines, not to mention the safety hazards for construction crews getting 
ready to dig in an area where utility lines have not been identified to them. Limiting access 
to information may have greater risks associated.  It is very important to select data 
protection measures that are commensurate to all the risks; in order to classify or restrict 
access to data; the risks must outweigh the benefits (United States Air Force, Air Mobility 
Command, 2005). 
Air Force policy towards restricting access to geospatial data is the exception rather 
than the rule (Dunn, 2005).  These restrictions “must be approved by the appropriate 
Headquarters Air Force (HAF) functional manager and must be based on public law, 
security classification or other DoD regulatory publication” (Dunn, 2005). Restrictions are 
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to “only be applied to the data identified and not the entire system or collective group of 
data in which it resides or is produced” (Dunn, 2005). Problems with this type of policy 
reside in the burden of management to track and communicate the necessary restrictions 
across multiple agencies and changing personnel. 
The challenge to data owners and stewards is to define what “sensitive information” 
is explicitly.  The current guideline that is offered to the geospatial data community for 
identifying sensitive data, determining their risks, and assessing benefits is based on three 
factors: 1) risk to security, 2) uniqueness, and 3) net benefit of disseminating the data.  
These three factors were central to the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) as 
they developed a decision tree intended to act as a guideline to help organizations decide on 
what is reasonable access to sensitive data as shown in Figure 7 (Federal Geographic Data 
Committee, 2005). It remains important to launch discussions within organizations so that 
they can begin to ask the initial questions to evaluate the content of their information. 







Figure 7.  Decision Tree for Providing Appropriate Access to Geospatial Data in Response 
to Security Concerns (Federal Geographic Data Committee, 2005) 
 
 
The sensitivity of derived geospatial data offers additional challenges. There are no 
established and validated mathematical formulas that can estimate the values of sensitivity 
when combining or querying multiple datasets. The same thought process in determining 
the sensitivity of the original work should be applied each time data is extracted or 
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combined to create a new way of looking at the information it provides (Federal 
Geographic Data Committee, 2005).  Concerns over these derived geospatial datasets 
supplicate the trepidations of aggregating information.  At what level of aggregation does 
information become sensitive?  The GeoBase program recognizes that there are some 
instances where storing and providing access to aggregated data would constitute a 
vulnerability, but work diligently to provide protection.  Currently, each installation is 
responsible for performing periodic reviews on all datasets and combinations thereof to 
determine if they come together and constitute an unacceptable risk (United States Air 
Force, Air Mobility Command, 2005). 
 
Information Sharing  
Although on smaller scale, the GeoBase offices have experienced the same type of 
challenges the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is facing in encouraging 
organizations to voluntarily share information. There is a sense of hesitation and 
uncertainty among data owners to share information, perhaps over fear liability, 
embarrassment, or a fear of loosing power or control. Regardless, the importance of sharing 
is paramount to ensuring consistent, well-informed decisions are being made. Failing to 
provide information, leaves data users to pursue and use less reliable sources. The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) captures the sentiment of many organizations in 
their March 2006 report entitled, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to 
Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism Related and Sensitive but 
Unclassified Information. Their report highlights the problems that offices such as the 
GeoBase office in the Air Force faces as an information broker, both a user and provider of 
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geospatial information. One of the biggest challenges is in the identification and 
designation of sensitive information. The GAO study found that over 26 federal agencies 
surveyed, there where 56 different sensitive but unclassified designations (Powner and 
Larence, 2006).  Typically, GeoBase offices are faced primarily with the following three 
designations: Classified (SECRET), For Official Use Only (FOUO), and Unclassified. The 
challenges of managing classified information have been discussed, but we can quickly see 
how intertwined these challenges are and the need to overcome these hurdles in the quest of 
sharing information. For example, consider emergency responders and command and 
control functions, such as the Survival Recovery Center (SRC) or Damage Control Groups 
(DCG), abilities to coordinate a safe cordon around a hazardous chemical spill without 
informative maps and critical geospatial information. If information is not shared and 
available for the people who need it to respond to emergencies or make command 
decisions, we have failed to secure ourselves by giving the most to the situation we 
possibly could. Geospatial information provides the security of knowing that the people 
making decisions have the tools they need to ensure our safety. 
 
An initial challenge of the GeoBase community was getting other organizations to 
understand the benefits of sharing information and realizing the power of a collective 
information bank. If information owners had a negative experience or the collective system 
did not satisfy their requirements, the willingness to share was gone, thus the potential to 
leverage their information against other has vanished. Most concerns associated with 
sharing information were related to the ability to ensure their information would be 
protected with at least the same level of effort (Powner and Larence, 2006). 
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The development of multi-level agreements would help users understand the 
responsibilities and the organization understand what information should be given out and 
to whom.  Examples of multi-level agreements are every time the Air Force collaborates 
with commercial entities, such as engineering design and construction firms, which require 
data for contract execution.  Often times, sharing data between services such as the Air 
Force and the Army, causes its own set of problems, creating duplicate datasets between 
services is against the “one installation, one map” motto. Serving overseas and working 
with a host nation has created difficulties in reaching agreements.  Multiple systems, often 
found overseas, require careful attention in detailing what can and cannot be shared. There 
is data that different agencies and countries need to be able to share, but in some situations 
this is not happening. Once the data is shared, there are very few controls that remain in 
place. Some of the major architectural-engineering firms have files and files of critical 
geospatial information in their project files and reference libraries. Although there are 
signed agreements, disclaimers, and consents, which are given at the time of data 
conveyance, the reality of the business process is that the government just has to trust that 
others understand the costs to security. 
 
Inconsistencies in Policies and Guidance 
The inconsistency of policies and guidance that drive business process continue to 
add complication to the information security challenge. Numerous existing studies, 
policies, instructions, guidance, recommendations, and directives have been issued at 
nearly every level of the Department of Defense (DoD). For the longest time, the guidance 
was deferred to each installation commander or relied on existing vague guidance from 
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other communities such as public affairs, operations security, or communications. No one 
policy or guidance lends assurance to geospatial data security and information sharing, 
each is interwoven and at times leaves room for interpretation or are contradictory. Even 
within the Air Force, the major commands, wings and squadrons differences exist in the 
way these documents are interpreted. Many installations have developed their own local 
policies to address their needs. Now, multiply these differences every time organizational 
leadership boundaries are crossed or as leadership within organizations change.     
    
Problems exist beyond the initial guidelines. For example, whose authority is it to 
change or restrict data? Is it different for each data layer? Who is to say that the data is 
useful for planning and executing an attack? The yes / no decisions are not as simple as the 
decision tree presents. Until organizations have a mutual level of understanding on how to 
make the complex qualitative decisions required for safeguarding information, there will 
continue to be added challenges. We are getting better, but there is still much work to do. 
The latest draft security policies, currently being vetted through the Air Force do much to 
help focus past inconsistencies. More than anything, having the conversation about security 
concerns and the need to share information is most important. The more information we 
can share on the challenges of security, the more we will be able to understand the problem 






Purpose and Organization 
 
There are many ways in which research can be conducted, research methods such as 
experiments, surveys, archival analysis, case studies, and historical research are like tools 
in a carpenter’s toolbox and the researcher must intelligently choose the most useful 
research tool from the toolbox to get the job done.  Choosing the wrong tool could lead to 
criticism of the conclusions.  Worse yet, selecting the wrong methodology wastes time in 
finding the answers to the researcher’s problem.  In developing a research strategy it is 
important to understand what tools are available and how they work to answer the 
questions.  This chapter discusses the approach to developing the methodology to provide 
the best way to answer the research questions, the value of the case study research strategy, 
and why an exploratory case study is the best approach for this research. 
 
Developing the Research Strategy 
 
Robert Yin, a respected researcher and expert in applied social science research 
methods, suggests that researchers should select strategies based off three situational 
factors “(a) the type of research question posed [the “who”, “what”, “where”, “how”, and 
“why” questions], (b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral 
events, and (c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events” (Yin, 
2003:5).  Figure 8 represents the basic research strategies that one can select from based 











who, what, where, 
how many, how much?
who, what, where, 
how many, how much?
how, why?

















Figure 8.  Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies  (Yin, 2003:5) 
 
 
Based upon this taxonomy of research strategies, the characteristics of this research are 
reviewed to determine which research methodology to employ.  In this research, the form 
of research questions have taken on the form of  “How and why questions are more 
explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case studies, histories, and experiments as the 
preferred research strategies” (Yin, 2003:6).  This helped further lead the research in the 
direction of a case study.   
 
The Extent of Control 
This research has very little or no control over the actual behavioral events.  The 
researcher cannot manipulate any of the behaviors or decisions and is far enough removed 
from the context of the organizations to exert any influence on the outcomes of the study.  
The experiment is the only strategy that requires the control of behavior.  There is currently 





The Degree of Focus 
The third factor in considering selection of research strategy is the degree of focus 
on contemporary as opposed to historical events.  Although it is important to understand 
the history and reasons why decisions were made, the research intent is to understand the 
contemporary events found with in the Air Force community.  The nature of the problem in 
itself is contemporary, as the Air Force has never faced the extent of these challenges 
brought about by technology and culture.    
Considering these situational factors, the researcher’s conclusion was that the best 
tool to tackle the intricacies of these research objectives is the case study method.   
 
Case Study Research 
The case study is one of many strategy tools for the researcher and has three basic 
purposes: explanation, description, and exploration.  “Doing a good case study is more than 
just looking at what is happening in a few instances. It is a special systematic way of 
looking at what is happening, of selecting the instances, collecting the data, analyzing the 
information, and reporting the results” (Datta, 1990:23).  A case study is useful for learning 
about complex circumstances and is the preferred strategy “when the investigator has little 
control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some 
real-life context” (Yin, 2003:1).  In this particular case, since GeoBase is relatively a new 
concept for the Air Force and has not been researched, applying case study strategy will 
help to contribute to the body of knowledge on the technical and cultural aspects of 
geospatial information systems.  Learning how GeoBase fits into the greater context of 
security and sharing is the goal of this case study research.   
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There are three predominant types of case study research: explanatory, descriptive 
and exploratory case studies.  The conditions of the study will again dictate which type of 
case study is most appropriate.  The explanatory is used to explain a course of events, 
whereas the descriptive study aims at presenting a complete description or overview of a 
phenomenon within a certain context.  In exploring the possibilities, the exploratory case 
study must both be able to explain and describe in order to have an in-depth understanding 
of the different aspects involved.  Sometimes it is necessary to explore questions and reach 
beyond the surface to develop measurement constructs for further research. 
 
Why an Exploratory Case Study? 
The exploratory case study is the most useful for evaluating programs where 
uncertainty exists and is designed to assist in the development of future evaluation 
questions, elements of measure, and new strategies.  Before investing in costly 
investigations, an exploratory case study can help pin point areas which may provide 
greater returns on investments in both time and money.  An exploratory case study helps to 
narrow the scope of future research so that it yields greater understanding and a logical 
place to start (Datta, 1990:40).  Case studies are the perfect tool, “aimed at defining the 
questions and hypotheses of a subsequent study or determining the feasibility of the desired 
research procedures” (Yin, 2003).   
 
Case Study Design 
This research employs a single-case with multiple units of analysis.  This embedded 
type of design was selected for several reasons.  First, its unique ability to be representative 
of the how geospatial information is treated in the military and “to capture the 
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circumstances and conditions of an everyday or common situation” in the Air Force (Yin, 
2003:41).  Another reason behind this rationale is that this particular case is revelatory, 
meaning that there has been relatively current changes in technology and the limited time 
and opportunity for researchers to study these newly raised problems.  A third advantage to 
the single-case study is that this will help to set a benchmark identifying issues and current 
processes that may aid in future longitudinal studies that can help compare two points in 
time (Yin, 2003:42).  The main unit of this case study is the US Air Force GeoBase 
community as a whole.  The embedded units of the headquarters element, different major 
commands (MAJCOMs), the relationship to joint services and other customers will be 
important to consider.  Depending on the level of analysis required on each embedded 
element, different data collection techniques will be used in order to enhance what is found 
in the single case environment.   
The framework to support this single-case (embedded) method is threefold: 1) 
define and design, 2) prepare, collect, & analyze, and 3) analyze and conclude.  These next 
sections will discuss the requirements, suitability, and selection of the case design. 
 
Step 1: Define and Design 
The initial stage of this research sets the foundation and direction for this case study 
(see Figure 9 below).  There are three sub stages important to understand before continuing 
into the rest of the research: 1) develop research questions, 2) select context and case, and 










Developing the Research Questions 
In the first stage, a specific definition of the problem helps to establish boundaries 
and reign in what type of case selection would be the most helpful in answering those 
questions.  In this research, the question focuses on seeking an understanding of 
information security and information sharing processes of geospatial information in the US 




Context and Case Selection 
The context of the case becomes clearer as we better understand what it is we want 
to accomplish.  The context and case of the GeoBase program office within the Air Force 
seems a natural case selection in the quest to find how we can get the most out of our 




Figure 10.  Case Study Design 
 
Defining the Units of Analysis 
Defining the units of analysis and designing the data collection protocol becomes 
the third biggest decision in setting up this research.  This research could take many 
directions dependent on the selection of the context and case.  For instance, we could have 
chosen to look at one particular major command or a specific unit.  Likewise, we could 
have broadened our context and broadened our scope to look at the entire Department of 
Defense.  Perhaps, these may be areas of interest for future research.  The focus of the 
primary research questions help to dictate what the appropriate unit of analysis should 
 
CONTEXT:  















become.  Instead, it seemed more appropriate to include in the exploration the entire US 
Air Force GeoBase program and examine the entire organization, from the Air Staff down 
to the unit level, as the unit of analysis.   
 
Data Collection Protocol 
Designing the data collection protocol further commits the focus of the research 
down a path, where we hope to find the most useful tools and evidence to develop answers 
to the complex research questions.  Yin discusses three principles case study researchers 
should follow to help deal with problems of validity and reliability (Yin, 2003:85).  These 
three principles: “(a) using multiple, not just single sources of evidence; (b) creating a case 
study database; and (c) maintaining a chain of evidence” are particularly important to the 
collection of data in case study research (Yin, 2003:85).  In this section, we will examine 
these three principles and explain their importance in the development of this research’s 
investigative protocol, identified in Appendix A. 
 
Using Multiple Sources of Evidence 
Therefore, the case data collection protocol for this research was established with 
both these principles and requirements of the human subjects review board in mind.  
Within the context of the questions, traces of evidence had to be found in order to 
corroborate converging ideas.  Yin cites six sources of evidence (see Table 1) and offers 
insight into their different strengths and weaknesses to consider when building supports for 
the case database.   
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Table 1.  Six Sources of Evidence: Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation &  
Archival Records 
• Stable – can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
• Unobtrusive – not created as a 
result of the case study 
• Exact – contains exact names, 
references, and details of an 
event 
• Broad coverage – long span of 
time, many events, and many 
settings  
• Precise and quantitative 
 
• Retrievability – can be low 
• Biased selectivity, if collection 
is incomplete 
• Reporting bias – reflects 
(unknown) bias of author 
• Access – may be deliberately 
blocked  
• Accessibility due to privacy 
reasons 
 
Interviews • Targeted – focuses directly on 
case study topic 
• Insightful – provides perceived 
causal inferences 
 
• Bias due to poorly constructed 
questions 
• Response bias 
• Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
• Reflexivity – interviewee gives 
what interviewer wants to hear 
 
Direct Observations • Reality – covers events in real 
time 




• Selectivity – unless broad 
coverage 
• Reflexivity – event may proceed 
differently because it is being 
observed 
• Cost – hours needed by human 
observers 
 
Participant Observation • (same as direct observations) 
• Insightful into interpersonal 
behavior and motives 
 
• (same as direct observations) 
• Bias due to investigator’s 
manipulation of events 
Physical Artifacts • Insightful into cultural features 







Creating the Case Study Database 
These sources of evidence are weighed against the nature of the case selected and 
begin to become the supporting structures in the construction of the case database.  This 






Figure 11.  Building the Case Study Database 
 
 
Subject Matter Expert (SME) Focus Interviews 
The case study interviews were not selected at random, but rather with careful 
consideration for the level of expertise, experience, and recognition as subject matter 
experts (SME).  Those interviewed represented a combination of military and civilian 
leaders/managers perspective that have primary responsibilities for GeoBase program.  The 
interviews were spread across different commands of the Air Force GeoBase Community.  
Interviews were conducted between the October 2006 and February 2007 timeframe.  
Interviews were conducted over the phone.  As per the human subjects review board 
exemption requirements, no identifying information obtained from the survey information 
or through interviews will be recorded, retained or reported in the final thesis.  This is to 















not be interpreted or used in such a way which would be damaging to the subject's financial 
standing, employability, or reputation.  The formal interview protocol can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Interview questions were developed and organized by the following common 
security categories: Administrative, Logical / Technical, and Physical controls, and further 




Table 2.  Common Control Categories 
 
Control Category Description Example 
Administrative Policies and procedures 
designed to enforce security 
rules 
- Hiring practices 
- Usage monitoring and accounting 
- Security awareness training  
- Data Sensitivity Matrices 
- Risk Assessment 
- Planning 
- System and Services Acquisition 
- Certification, Accreditation, and 
Security Assessments 
 
Logical / Technical Object access restrictions 
implemented through the use 
of software or hardware 
- User identification and 
authentication 
- Encryption 
- Segregated network architecture 
- Personnel Security 
- Physical and Environmental 
Protection 
- Contingency Planning 
- Configuration Management 
- Maintenance 
- System and Information Integrity 
- Media Protection 
- Incident Response 
- Awareness and Training 
Physical Physical access to hardware 
limited 
- Identification and Authentication 
- Access Control 
- Fences 
- Walls 
- Locked doors 
- Audit and Accountability  
- System and Communications 
Protection  
derived from (Solomon and Chapple, 2005; Swanson, Hash, and Bowen, 2006.) 
 






Policy documents are physical evidence and can be used to help corroborate 
information from other sources and triangulate in on situational facts (Yin, 2003:87).  
These documents play a key role in evaluating the current expected business practices 
policy makers place on organizations to drive actions towards information security and 
information sharing.   An examination of the Air Force policies and their timeline regarding 
the GeoBase program may provide insight into patterns or causes of practices that help or 
hinder the intent.  As this research will further discuss in chapters four and five, how the 
organization chooses to construct, interpret, and implement policy will lead to certain 
actions and responses from the affected organizations.  The strength, weaknesses, or lack of 
policy all together will influence the program’s behavior.  The final analysis will 
incorporate what was found in this exploratory case study.  Appendix F lists the relevant 
policies and guidance documents found in this research.   
 
Archival Records 
Very similar to the documentation of policy documents, archival records are often 
seen in the form of service records, organizational records (charts and budgets), maps and 
charts, lists, survey data, and personal records (calendars, phone lists, memorandums) (Yin, 
2003:89).  Any archival records found will be used to help support and lend further 
credibility to the chain of evidence.   
  
Customer Interviews 
As we study the geospatial information processes, particularly in the GeoBase 
environment, it is important to recognize the customer, whom receives the final benefit.  
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Hammer and Champy describe processes as “...a collection of activities that takes one or 
more kinds of input and creates an output that is of value to the customer” (Hammer and 
Champy, 2003).  If part of the primary goal of this research is to “maximize USAF mission 
processes and minimize customer inefficiencies”, then it becomes very important to 
understand our customer’s perspective as we form opinions and policy.  This research will 
consider a few key customers in the GeoBase process, but will not have time to exhaust the 
list of many who receive value from receiving geospatial information. 
 
Observations 
By being aware of the things that are happening around oneself is made in part to 
the observations that take place.  “Such observations serve as yet another source of 
evidence in a case study” (Yin, 2003:92).  Observations of how geospatial information 
systems (GIS) work can be invaluable at understanding the technologies being used and the 
problems or limitations that might be encountered (Yin, 2003:93).  
 
Web Statistics 
Although statistics may be grouped as a type of archival records, in this case, there 
was enough of a distinction to try to find usage statistics of the web servers from each of 
the primary GeoBase / GeoReach web servers.  Using the web statistics from each of the 
commands may help in understanding who the primary customers are; where, when, and 
what they are using geospatial information for; and it there are any patterns or outliers that 
may help to streamline their user experience and reduce risks to the information.  Although 
this information may be helpful, there were difficulties in collecting such information.  As 
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web statistics become more prevalent and more appropriate metrics are used and 
understood, this information will become more useful in the future.  Some basic 
information, which could be shared, was discussed in the interviews. 
 
Maintaining a Chain of Evidence 
In order to ensure that the case database maintains its reliability, everything that 
goes into the case database must be from reliable evidence.  To help ensure reliability of 
the database, the third principle of maintaining a chain of evidence was employed.  This 
“chain of evidence” helps to link the case study questions to the final case study report 
through the protocol, citations to sources, and the integrity of the case study database.  
What is desired is that the research has “been able to move from one part of the case study 
process to another, with clear cross-referencing to methodological procedures and the 
resulting evidence” (Yin, 2003:105).  The ability for the research audience to trace 
evidence up and down the chain will strengthen the conclusions of the research. 
 
Step 2: Prepare, Collect, and Analyze 
 
The second stage of this research builds upon the foundations set in the first stage 
by preparing, collecting, and analyzing that which was laid out in the definition and design 
of the protocol.  This phase consists of two basic actions, conduct and write the embedded 






Figure 12.  Single-Case Study (embedded) Method - Phase 2.(Yin, 2003:50) 
 
 
Conducting Units of Analysis 
Conducting each unit of analysis would draw upon the data collection protocol, 
which taps into all the sources of evidence that could be found.  In this case, knowing that 
with these particular research questions and the nature of the organization the data would 
come primarily from conducting personal interviews with leaders in the field who had a 
good understanding and reputation in their areas of experience and expertise.  Conducting 
this type of personal investigation would lean heavily on the understanding of the following 
five basic investigative skills: 1) question asking, 2) listening, 3) being adaptive and 
flexible, 4) grasp of the issues being studied, and 5) lack of bias (Yin, 2003:59).  
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This case study has been developed to include six embedded units of analysis 
within the case of the USAF GeoBase program and make up the different aspects of the 
GeoBase program that may be of interest of information security and information sharing.  
They are: 
 
1)  Headquarters’ Air Force (HQAF) 
2)  USAF Major Commands (MAJCOMs) 
3)  Base Level GeoBase Integration Offices (GIOs) 
4)  Joint Services 
5)  Policies & Guidance 
6)  GeoBase Consumers  
 
      
 
 
Methods of Analysis 
Once we obtain the data for each of the individual units of analysis, a cross-
functional analysis will take place.  This research will employ three techniques, 
recommended by the GAO Case study Guidance, to take and analyze the data, in an 
attempt to make out what it might mean.  The first technique will be to pool together all the 
different sources of evidence, across the entire case database, from interviews, 
observations, documents, and policies for an extensive or “thick” analysis. (Datta, 
1990:20).  The second technique will be to analyze the data through triangulation, or as Yin 
describes as “convergence of evidence” (Yin, 2003:100).  By identifying matching patterns 
or themes may be useful in building explanations.  The third technique employed will be 
 
 53
the comparison of evidence for consistency.  Depending on the type of data found, a 
categorical matrix, charts, graphs, tables, or timelines may help to substantiate conclusions.   
 
Writing the Embedded Analysis Report 
Conducting each unit of analysis would draw upon the data collection protocol, in 
which the written report will be in the traditional question-answer narrative format.  With 
as many research questions posed from the beginning, it seems logical to follow through 
with the same organization style.  Yin notes advantages of this style as “a reader need only 
examine the answers to the same question or questions within each case study to begin 
making cross-case comparisons.  Because each reader may be interested in different 
questions, the entire format facilitates the development of a cross-case analysis tailored to 
the specific interests of its readers” (Yin, 2003:148).  “A series of questions can be posed, 
with the answers taking some reasonable length…and can contain all the relevant evidence 
and can be augmented with tabular presentations and citations” (Yin, 2003:148). 
 
Step 3: Analyze and Conclude 
The third and final stage of this research methodology consists of taking everything 
that we set out to learn in the first stage and what we discovered in the second stage and 







Figure 13.  Single-Case Study (embedded) Method - Phase 3 (Yin, 2003:50) 
 
 
This stage often is just the beginning of new questions and new theories.  As 
conclusions are drawn and the original theory modified, these new understandings will 
enable us to make better-educated decisions about the subject in the future, such as new 
policies and guidance or focus for funding.  This is why it is important to capture these 
conclusions, theories, and implications into a written report to communicate this new 
understanding to others with similar and overlapping interests and questions.    
This third step will begin to manifest itself in chapter four, where the discussion 
will be directed at answering the primary research questions, drawing conclusions from the 
case database, and developing an idea of what kind of implications may be drawn from the 
findings.  There are five general characteristics of exemplary case studies and are measures 
 
 55
of how this report will be gauged.  These five characteristics are that the case study must 1) 
be significant, 2) be complete, 3) consider alternative perspectives, 4) display significant 





Limitations, strengths and weaknesses are inherent in all types of research.  The 
purpose of this section is to present the boundaries of the research and so that the reader 
may understand where these potential pitfalls may lie.  There are three main categories 
which will be examined; “those relating to the researcher himself, those related to the 
researcher’s perspective of the subject matter, and those related to the data being collected 
by the case study researcher” (West, 2006:155).  Some researchers warn of the temptation 
to spend too much time on the exploratory phase of research or do not cast a wide enough 
net either out of convenience or because the exploration does not cover the problem 
adequately.  In addition, it may be too early to begin exploring, thus understand the 
maturity level of the program or organization is essential.  There have also been instances 
where the researcher becomes over involved and the research only seeks to confirm 
personal views rather than test them.  Another caution is that sometimes case study 
evidence does not pan out the way in which it was originally thought and can potentially 
change the case.  It is important to investigate all possible concerns prior to committing to a 
particular case to avoid misrepresentation (Yin, 2003:42).  Table 3 summarizes the 




Table 3.  Summary of Potential Pitfalls 
 
Pitfalls  Limitations, Strengths and/or Weaknesses 
Researcher • Adequate exploration / investigation 
• Over involvement 
• Personal bias 
• Researcher’s assumptions 
• Competency 
• Expertise (Grasp of the issues being studied) 
• Ability to adapt to situations 
• Flexible 
• Influences 
• Judgment & Intuition 
• Investigative Skills  
o Interview/question asking 
o Listening 
o Note taking 




• Subject complexities 
• Context (What’s happening around the subject) 
• Richness and detail 
• Technical skill requirements 
• Breadth and depth 
• Experience 
• Understanding of subject 
• Knowledge of patterns and causes 
 
Data • Reliability 
• Commitment (length & time) 
• Captures context 
• Interpretation 
• Lack of variety of data types 
• Number of variable and data points 




• Quality control 
• Impartiality 
• Relationship between data collected and research question 
• Publication basis may severely limit generalization 
• Inadequate or uncertain quality of original data 
• Inadequate methods of relating findings 
• Quality of data-reduction procedures may be very difficult to 
determine the effects of changes in many contextual factors over 
time may be difficult to separate from effects of the programs 
• Insufficient attention to management and data reduction 
• Inefficiency, lateness, incomplete use of data 







Summary of Methodology 
 
This chapter discussed the approach taken in the development of the research 
methodology, designed to provide the most appropriate way to answer the research 
questions.  Research into different methodologies led to the case study research method due 
to the contemporaneous nature of the subject.  Since focus on geospatial information has 
primarily been focused on the creation and application of the data, we are just beginning to 
explore the ramifications of this newly applied technology and the way we share and secure 
information.  The exploratory case study method was the best way to learn more to 
positively impact the future direction of the field.  This chapter also has discussed the three 
steps of the case study design and walked through how this research effort has been defined 
and designed, data preparation, collection and analysis, and sets the stage for the outcomes 







The purpose of this chapter is to present the case database and bring about a better 
understanding to the six primary research questions set forth in chapter one.  The research 
is comprised of an exploratory case study that involves multiple interviews, collection of 
policy, memorandums, and guidance documents, as well as GeoBase conference papers 
and presentations, as discussed in chapter three.  Analysis of the case database will be 
presented using a question-answer narrative format.  The primary research question will be 
presented and answers will draw on all available sources of evidence from the developed 
case database. 
 
PG1  What is the nature of the security risk posed by GeoBase? 
 
As in the literature review, the nature of the security risk posed by military 
geospatial information, like that which the GeoBase program office manages, is not any 
different from other types of geospatial information.  However, the information being 
produced for the garrison and expeditionary installation equate to details of the Air Force’s 
primary war-fighting weapon system.  Air Force installations can be considered more like a 
naval aircraft carrier rather than an Army installation, for the air base is the platform from 
which the Air Force mission is won.  Just as the details of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the aircraft carrier would be protected, so too should the details of the Air Force 
installation.  With as many airmen, civil servants, contractors, and dependents that are a 
part of each installation, it becomes increasingly difficult and easier to forget this is a war-
fighting platform, not a place of business or the neighborhood around the corner.  Military 
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installations face different threats and have their individual vulnerabilities.  Together, they 
create risks to the system and people operating that system.   
 
What are the geospatial assets in need of protection?  
Four primary groups make up the geospatial data assets that the information 
security programs seek to protect.  They include, 1) the geospatial data itself, including all 
vector, raster, associated attribute tables, and metadata; 2) the software applications that 
power the GIS capabilities; 3) the installation network capabilities which provide 
accessibility to the information, to include the Air Force portal; and 4) the GIS products 
themselves, such as maps, websites, videos, and reports. (Lachman, 2006).  
  
What are the top security concerns of GeoBase today? 
To understand the nature of the GeoBase security risks, let us first identify the 
primary problems found in this field (see Table 4 below).  Several interesting discussions 
emerged as the top issues, which include: 
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1. Awareness of 
vulnerabilities and 
threats (risks) 
With many, the many unknowns about the vulnerabilities 
and threats to geospatial information drive fears that link 
to a managerial instinct to “turn it off” or hide it.  These 
fears impede potentially useful information from making 
it into the hands of those who can make the most from it.  
 
Information users don’t realize the value and how careful 
we need to be with geospatial data  
 
People are not familiar with the different threats and 
vulnerabilities to the system and information.  In many 
cases they are unknown  
 
Maps and information are becoming commonplace and 















No process in place to determine classification of data 
layers 
 
The more we combine data, the higher the risks.  Comm 
has a good understanding of that as they have 
traditionally placed more security on their comm. data 
than CE has ever put on our utility data. 
 
As we compile layers of information together, what 
makes it classified and what does not?  Where is the 
policy that says whether it is classified or not and who is 
to say what classify level that information is.  To date 
Intel (or each stovepipe) does their stuff, but as far as the 
agile combat support world, they do not touch it.   
 
This is all very dynamic process as we are constantly 
developing new data and information, as well as adding 
and combining (weave or braid) this information 
together.  Reviewing and monitoring these aggregated 










3. Access Policy Information systems are opening up broader access to so 
many more people than in the past.  Before you had to 
go and ask for copies of the base map tabs from CE, now 
that information is provided straight to your desktop with 
no questions asked.  Although, this is not a bad thing, it 
is something to be aware of as the program continues to 
develop and business practices are laid through policy. 
 
Individual data stewards are on their own to determine 





4. Release of data to 
contractors / non-
government entities  
Contractors do not have access to the network of 
information that they must have to do the work required 
of them (design / construction).  CDs of information are 
handed over to contractors with nothing more than a 
clause in the contract agreement saying that they will 
destroy or return all data when the job is complete.  
However, once the information walks out the door, there 
is no control over it.  Often not considered are the 
security policies, networks, and practices of the offices 
of both the contractors and subcontractors hired to work 




5. Improper or 
unauthorized 
access to critical 
infrastructure or 
security data. 
Organizations making data publicly available without 
going through appropriate channels. 
 
Foreign release to foreign governments without access to 
our secure systems. (GCCS, COIN, etc).  This is a major 














What Security Controls are available? 
In exploring what types of risk that GeoBase geospatial information poses on to this war-
fighting system, three primary classes of risk were found that could be controlled (see 
Table 5):   
Table 5.  Primary Security Controls 
Control Type Description 
Technical “those aspects of the computer system which define 
security requirements for the applications and assist 
in detecting violations to prevent unauthorized 
access or misuse 
Managerial which focus on the management controls and 
element of managing risk 
Operational the way managerial and technical decisions are put 
into operation and are mostly people driven versus 
system driven” (Swanson et al, 2006:25). 
 
 
After reviewing the literature on information security, there was a noticeable connection in 
what was being discussed in the interviews, which spanned the experience from the 
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different levels of the GeoBase organization, to that which federal information system 
security experts have begun to examine.  It is clear that the problems and concerns of the 
GeoBase program is experiencing fits well into the families of security control categories 
as identified in the Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems 
(Swanson et al, 2006.) and the recently released special publication of Recommended 
Security Controls for Federal Information Systems (Ross et al, 2006) (see Table 6 below). 
 
Table 6.  Security Control Classes and Families (Swanson et al, 2006) 
 
Class Control Family Name Identifier
Technical Access Control AC
Technical Audit and Accountability AU
Technical Identification and Authentification IA
Technical System and Communication Protection SC
Operational Awareness Training AT
Operational Configuration Management CM
Operational Contingency Planning CP
Operational Incident Response IR
Operational Maintenance MA
Operational Media Protection MP
Operational Personnel Security PS
Operational Physical and Environmental Protection PE
Operational System and Information Integrity SI
Management Certification, Accrediation, and Security Assements CA
Management Planning PL
Management Risk Assessment RA




The identified seventeen security control families were similar to the areas of high-
risk areas identified in the interviews of the case study database.  Organizing the top topics 
found in the case study database by security control family reveals the primary areas of 
risk.  Identifying these security control factors, researchers are able to begin to provide 
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guidance and develop metrics for mapping different types of information and information 
security categories. 
 
What are the ways in which GeoBase offices are controlling information today? 
The GeoBase offices rely on two separate systems and their ability to maintain an 
appropriate level of information assurance.  If any piece of information is classified, then it 
is separated out and stored on the SIPRNet classified system.  The Secret Internet Protocol 
Router Network (SIPRNET) is the primary network for U.S. only secret-level (SECRET-
NOFORN) data.  Unclassified information is controlled on the NIPRNet, “the Unclassified 
but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) provides seamless 
interoperability for unclassified combat support applications, as well as controlled access to 
the Internet” (DISA, 2006).  Today, each of these systems, access is restricted primarily by 
the smart military identification card, known as the Common Access Card (CAC).  These 
cards “store 64KB of data storage and memory on a single integrated circuit chip (ICC). 
This CAC technology allows for rapid authentication and enhanced security for all physical 
and logical access.  Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates embedded in the card 
enable cardholders to “sign” documents digitally, encrypt emails, and establish secure 
online network connections” (Department of Defense).  CAC Cards can only be issued 
after the following physical background checks have been accomplished:  
• “A SF-86 Form has been completed and submitted to the appropriate Personnel 
Security Representative  




• A National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI)* background security check is in 
the process of being completed” (Department of Defense). 
 
Access to the common installation pictures (CIPs), once provided directly from 
MAJCOM GeoBase servers, and now are made available via the Air Force Portal, where 
users must have an Air Force Portal account and CAC login.  At the installations, beyond 
the CIP, further access restrictions are put on the GeoBase service depending on the data 
and functional owner of that data and purpose of the mapping service.  For example, the 
integrated base defense viewer, communications viewer, anti-terrorism force protection 
viewer, are limited at the service level and limited to only authorized users on the network 
as determined by the owning organization’s data steward.  For the majority of the GeoBase 
customers, access is granted via CAC login.   
 
Base maps have been accessible over the Air Force Portal and base local networks 
(intranets) before CAC technology was available and GIOs relied on local password 
control systems and access from a .mil account, which allowed the GIO to limit access to 
the system.  Access control lists are cumbersome and difficult to maintain.  Someone is 
required to maintain an access database, which then ties to ArcIMS, that contains a list of 
separate login names and passwords.  This database resides on a server with its own 
inherent vulnerabilities.  As users come and go or Ops tempo increases, this list is difficult 
to maintain and is not as secure as it could be.  Other ways of restricting access, though not 
necessarily a security measure, was to assign an obscure URL address that helps in 
decreasing traffic to the site.  Over the last few years, the need for control has grown.  
Since much of the initial data that was being collected were internal to the civil engineering 
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organization, it was much easier to control and know who needed what and why.  As the 
need and collection of data has expanded beyond the civil engineering center of gravity, 
there is an increased need for new controls measures. 
 
As policies and technology have enabled the standard CAC identification tools, PKI 
certificates, and combined with the advantages of the portal’s active directory controls for 
network logins and passwords, the GeoBase leaders are better assured their information is 
making into trusted hands.  GeoBase is becoming more integrated into the Portal and using 
the Portal access manager, which allow for the same tools that Portal is using now to 
govern who gets access to what and trickles down to the layer and attribute levels.  This 
allows GeoBase administrators to begin to more efficiently customize access to any part of 
the information.  Now, instead of giving someone access to the entire geodatabase, 
administrators can fine-tune access, providing only the knowledge required.  For example, 
it could allow someone who is getting ready to dig in an area the ability to see that there is 
a utility line in the way, but would not disclose the attribute details of the utility line, such 
as if it is a T1 or T5 communications line, classified, unclassified, or what facilities it 
services.   
 
By CAC authentification and setting up a user group policies defined by data 
stewards, or subject matter experts (SMEs), and controlled by active directory group 
policies using the CAC certificate.  Each SME tells the GIO who needs to be included in 
those groups.  Most commands make available what information is available, but do not 
provide access unless the data steward, responsible for that data grants the GIO permission 
to provide access.  Data not available provides contact information on how and who 
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authorization is needed.  Each individual data steward determines the requestor’s need to 
know, then advises the GIO on who to allocate permissions and for how long.  Based on 
the web solution, it is possible to lock down individual features and/or attribute layers.   
 
MAJCOMs are testing a more robust “Secure Map” application (beta test being 
worked), to be used to help restrict access on the portal by CAC logon down to the layer 
and attribute level.  For example, if you are in security forces and have a security forces 
role (need to know), then when you log on with your CAC card, you will be able to see all 
data and attributes defined as of interest to security forces, perhaps it is security camera 
locations, access routes, entry control points, or other type of information in the security 
forces mission data set (MDS).  However, if you are not part of that role, then you can only 
see the CIP and will not have access the other information.  In this case, the owner of the 
information must assign roles and define access limitations.  These limitations are set using 
either individual ids or associated group settings, just like email groups such as “SRC 
members” or “Command Post Personnel”. 
 
CAC controls such as these help add layers of security onto the installation’s basic 
three-tiered firewall system that are set up to limit users to: 1) base only personnel, 2) 
MAJCOM domain only, or 3) .mil only.  Users with .mil access cover the widest range of 
access to GeoBase information, the CIP. 
 
Security controls for the web-based side of providing information are completely 
different from the non-web based networks for the more savvy GIS user.  These users tend 
to work directly off the hard drive space, memory stick, CD/DVD, and with paper copies.  
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How they manage security is different from how security is managed for the web-based 
networks.     
The nature of the security risks associated with GeoBase is multifaceted and 
complex, just like risks other information systems face.  Geospatial information is to the 
installation as your personal finance information is to you.  Just as someone can do damage 
with the information of your bank account, they too can do damage knowing critical 
information about the base.  It is important to safeguard the information, but as in business, 
if you want to get paid account information must be shared.  Sure, there is an element of 
trust, but we understand the risks and the safeguards in place for our finances.  We must 
come to understand the technical, operational, and managerial security aspects of the 
geospatial information with which we work. 
 
 
PG2  What information is sensitive that poses a risk to security? 
 
This question is one that continues to plague the experts.  The sensitivity of 
information depends directly with the capabilities that a piece of knowledge of information 
opens up to someone with access.  Things have become so much more common and 
available to the public through multiple media outlets, especially the in the use of the 
internet.  So much of our environment that was once limited knowledge, like information 
about our installations, now have expanded beyond a limited community network and into 
public domain where anyone can access this information.  This is why it has become 
increasingly more important for us to identify and control information early on that needs 
to remain in a protected environment.  “Identifying data sensitivity is critical for 
determining the security controls that should be used to protect the connected systems and 
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the data” (Grance, Hash, Peck, Smith, and Korow-Diks, 2002:3-3).  As the GeoBase 
community continues to collect and consolidate information, they do so under the same 
guidelines that they have been familiar to them in the past.  Under this question, it is also 
important to explore how geospatial information is currently being classified, who defines 
the classification of this information, what type of information are considered sensitive, and 
how security information is being tracked in the GIS system.  
 
How is geospatial information classified? 
Currently, information is categorized into two main levels of classification, based 
on the individual merits of the information as either Classified or Unclassified.  However, 
information that is unclassified is routed into one of three subcategories: 1) Sensitive, but 
Unclassified, 2) Unclassified, For Official Use Only (FOUO), or 3) Unclassified, Public 
Information (FOIA). “The fact that this guide indicates that some information may be 
unclassified does not imply that that information is automatically releasable to the public. 
Unclassified information…intended for public release must be reviewed for sensitivity and 
processed through appropriate channels for approval in accordance with DoD Instruction 
5230.9, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release””(Stenbit, 2003).  
“Classification is reserved for specific categories of information or the compilation of 
related information as defined in Executive Order 12958” (Stenbit, 2003).  GeoBase is 
quickly falling into this gray area of classification by compilation and to date has not been 
determined as classified, as most compilations are not.  “However, in certain 
circumstances, information that would otherwise be marked UNCLASSIFIED may become 
classified when combined or associated with other UNCLASSFIED information, if the 
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compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship. See DoD Regulation 
5200.1-R.  Under such circumstances, it is the combination or compilation of information 
that is classified, not the individual items of information. Users of this SCG must be aware 
of such a possibility when compiling UNCLASSIFIED information.  Likewise, the 
compilation of classified information must be classified, at a minimum, at the highest 
classification within the aggregated data, but may become a higher classification if the 
compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship” (Stenbit, 2003).  
The graph below (Figure 14) estimates how geospatial information in the GeoBase 


























It is important to note that although the level of work being classified as SECRET, the 
majority of the information is not imagery or data related, but rather troop locations and 
vulnerabilities tied to a specific operation or wartime plan in base support plans.  There are 
extensive rules, policies, and training on who, what, why, and how long information 
becomes classified at the SECRET level.  Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, part 
2001 provides explicit reasons why information should be classified.  This Executive order 
“prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national 
security information.  It also establishes a monitoring system to enhance its effectiveness.  
This Directive sets forth guidance to agencies on original and derivative classification, 
downgrading, declassification, and safeguarding of classified national security 
information” (Information Security Oversight Office, 2003).  Information falling into any 
of the categories below should be considered for a classification decision: 
 
• “military plans, weapons systems, or operations 
• foreign government information 
• intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, 
or cryptology 
• foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential 
sources 
• scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, 
which includes defense against transnational terrorism 
• United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities 
• vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, 
plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense 
against transnational terrorism 




However, little has been done to examine and evaluate information that does not 
necessarily meet the criteria for the TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL 
classified data, but is still sensitive.  Wading into the “Sensitive, but Unclassified” waters, 
one finds themselves over their head in muddy water.  This is one of the biggest challenge 
areas the GeoBase program faces in the security of its operations.  Especially as the Air 
Force continues to become more efficient in organizing their database systems.  The power 
of organizing information together into one system has changed how the Air Force must 
gauge the sensitivity of information as well as how we must work to protect this new type 
of aggregated information, which we need to remain widely accessible to those needing the 
information.  In following questions analysis is provided at some of the impacts and costs 
found in restricting access by classifying information. 
 
Three primary major commands produce GeoReach information, which is 
expeditionary geospatial information (GeoBase-like) for forward operating locations which 
aim to deliver the “one map” for the contingency environment.  The remaining commands 
depend on this GeoReach information as a customer.  Even though so many aspects about 
what are associated with deployable locations are classified, the information these 
GeoReach maps are derived from are not necessarily classified.  For example, if we had a 
GeoReach location in Mongolia, it is not necessarily about the data itself, but what the data 
implies.  You can get the same information off Google Earth or other sources.  For this 
reason, two of the three commands have posted their GeoReach data on the AF Portal, 
giving the same level of attention and detail to each, thus no way to jump to a conclusion 
that one is more strategically important.  The other command has taken the approach that in 
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their command, the implications are too great and do not want conclusions to be made.  
Part of the intent of GeoReach is to supply educated troops to the theater.  Providing troops 
access to the information on the locations they are serving, there are only minute 
differences in weather they find it on the SIPRnet, Air Force Portal, or Google Earth.   
There are still GeoReach and GeoBase information that will be used to tie classified 
information to a location, making it geospatial classified information and required to 
operate on the SIPRnet service to those with the appropriate SECRET level clearances. 
 
Who defines the classification of geospatial information? 
 The data owner/steward of the information currently makes this determination with 
the help of the GeoBase administrator.  The majority of the GeoBase offices do not deal 
with classified information, if they do, then they are not aware of it or it is yet to be 
determined.  Individually, these mission data layers are classified at the FOUO level.    
Right now GeoBase offices are publishing a lot of geospatial information, if something 
looks like it should be sensitive, then the data owner is consulted and layer by layer, 
solutions are put into place. 
The current security practices are an amalgamation of historical documents and 
business practices, agreements, policies, processes, and new requests by data stewards and 
the data layer owners.  Although the GeoBase administrators and data stewards do their 
best, they cannot do it in isolation.  The Air Force is notorious for allowing decisions to be 
made at the base level for the best interest of unique situations at each installation.  
However, with decisions on information classification, continuity amongst how 
information is to be classified is important across commands and across the service.  The 
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GeoBase office and data stewards are not the only perspectives that this decision should be 
based.  Other fields of expertise such as the Opsec, Infosec, and Commsec communities 
have valuable expertises that are not currently involved in the process.  These 
determinations must be made and are the most difficult aspect of applying the technological 
controls.  Someone has to make the call on who should be allowed to see what.   
 
What types of information is considered sensitive? 
As data is collected using the global positioning system (GPS) are tied to points, 
lines, and areas to particular places (latitudes and longitudes), within an accuracy of often 
less than 1m, in many minds this information can be considered sensitive.  Examples of 
geospatial type information that may be considered sensitive and in certain cases, 
classified: 
• QD Arcs (Explosive Safety zones) 
• Crash Grids 
• AICUZ Contours 
• Archeological Locations 
• Critical Infrastructures (Barker, Jun 2004.) 
o Agriculture and Food (Including farms and food processing plants) 
o Water (Including federal reservoirs and municipal waste water facilities) 
o Public Health (Including hospitals and federal health organizations) 
o Emergency Services (Including federal, state, and local response units) 
o Defense Installations and Defense Industrial Base 
o Telecommunications (Including switching and transmission/cable facilities) 
o Energy (Including electric, oil, and gas production , transmission facilities) 
o Transportation (Aviation, rail, highway, pipelines, maritime, mass transit) 
o Banking/Finance (Including federal services and FDIC insured institutions) 
o Chemical Industry/Hazardous Materials (e.g., chemical plants) 
o Postal and Shipping Facilities 
• Key Assets (Barker, Jun 2004.) 
o Nuclear Power Plants 
o National Monuments and Icons 
o Dams 
o Government Facilities 
o Commercial Assets 
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• Troop locations 
• Troop movements 
• Asset allocations 
 
 
 The problem is that in many cases, the data is so readily available, whether the Air 
Force has created it or some commercial source creates it.  If someone wants coordinates or 
any good level of accuracy, they could go to Space Imaging or other commercial site and 
find what they are looking for.  What makes this palatable are that it is more difficult to 
find out which facilities are what, such as command posts, munitions storage, supply 
warehouses, etc. However, this type of information is slowly creeping from the private 
domain to the more public domain.  The interviews expressed there have been incidents 
where investigators have had to take maps out of peoples’ hands that they have made or 
had unauthorized access to.  Examples in a deployed environment have included escorts 
finding and confiscating detailed maps from third country nationals (TCNs).  Whether they 
have acquired it from the trash, find it on base, or have one that they have diagramed out on 
their own, pacing off specific details of the installation.  It is much easier to point to the 
hard copy evidence such as maps found in possession of those without a good need to 
know, but as far as the electronic versions of maps and the network, it is much more 
difficult to evaluate the magnitude of security incidents.   
 
 
How is security information tracked in GIS? 
 All geospatial information has two types of information that is stored and managed 
in a relational database management system (RDBMS).  The first is information dataset; 
this is the primary attribute data table that stores information about each entity.  The second 
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set of data it stores is data about the data, known as the metadata set.  Both datasets store 
information about the security classification system and the security classification.  In some 
instances, there may be a need to identify the primary data as “Unclassified” or “FOUO” 
but the metadata may contain information about how the data was collected and is 
classified as “Sensitive”.  Table 7 is an example of the metadata security information from 
the Spatial Data Standards for Facilities, Infrastructure, and Environment (SDSFIE). 
 
Table 7.  Tabular Metadata Security Information Template (Headquarters Air Force 
Geo Integration Office, April 2006:20) 
 
7.10 Metadata Security Information 
7.10.1 Metadata Security 
Classification System 
The name of the classification 
system for the metadata 
Valid Value: 
 
7.10.2 Metadata Security 
Classification 
The name of the handling 







The Air Force’s standards for the RDBMS data model is defined by the SDSFIE 
industry standard which “are developed and maintained by the CADD/GIS Technology 
Center for Facilities, Infrastructure, and Environment located in the U.S. Army Engineer 
Research and Development Center's Topographic Engineering Office (ERDC TEC) in 
Alexandria, VA.  The SDSFIE are developed in a collaborative fashion with input from 







PG3  What impacts might information security concerns affect information sharing. 
Information sharing remains at the heart of the GeoBase any disruptions or barriers 
that affect information sharing will be of impact.  Part of this case study was to ascertain if 
concerns over information security affects how people share or may not share information.  
In order to address this question appropriately, let us first assess if the GeoBase community 
has any problems with information sharing.  If so, what are they and how is the sense of 
security tied to information sharing?  Finally, evaluate how these concerns, or perceived 
barriers, affect information sharing. 
 
What are the reasons for not sharing?  
The research interviews indicated that each organization faced their share of 
challenges in establishing relationships that allowed for open exchange of information both 
within and between organizations.  When asked of the problems they encountered, fear and 
the lack of understanding contributed the most to the hesitation to share information.  Table 
8 indicates the perceived problems for not wanting to share information.   
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Table 8.  Reasons for not wanting to share information 
 
Areas of Concern Description 
Ignorance 
• Lack of understanding typically drives the fear, power, and 
control issues. 
 
• There are a lot of senior level decision makers and information 
controllers who are not familiar with the new information culture, 
the capabilities, and potential for both the positive and negative 
benefits that can come from sharing information. 
 
Fear 
• Natural tendencies are to keep a close hold of your data.  Many 
users are afraid of the data / data quality and if they were to 
expose it they would lose control of the data.   
 
• People often fear that their data may not be correct and do not 
want others to see that their data is not right.   
 
• Fear of liability 
 
• Similarly, users fear that people won’t understand the intricacies 
of their information and develop the wrong conclusions  
 
• Fear of losing either control of their information or the power they 
feel the information provides them. 
 
Power 
• The old adage knowledge is power still rings true.  Some people 
consider the data theirs and without it their job or purpose within 
the organization will become lessened if they share it. 
 
Control 
• At the base level, some data stewards do not want to share data 
with those beyond their immediate organizations, often to 
maintain decision control over their turf. 
 
Imposed Restrictions 
• Particularly with sharing regional information picture (RIP) data 
and imagery, in the local counties whom have shared information 
and imagery through a memorandum of agreement.  Often it 
comes down to licensing and agreements.  We must recognize 




• As connections are made, relatively simple hurdles often stand in 
the way of the willingness to share and tend to become excuses 
for not wanting to put the effort and energy into what may look to 






Figure 15 illustrates as concerns grow, the willingness to share information drops or 
that people are more likely to share information when there are few concerns.   The areas of 
concern are divided out as they were discussed or presented, notice how each are 

































Figure 15.  Impact of Security Concerns on Information Sharing 
  
 
As these areas of concern are assessed, one has to consider how fears are fueled or 
calmed by the feeling of security.  The blanket of security helps users feel secure enough to 
release fears or losing control, power, or that something is going to happen to the data.  To 
overcome these fears and feel more secure about decisions about information, education 
has been the only way to combat this problem.   
 
A post 9/11 GAO report to the Secretary of Homeland Security in August of 2003 
on efforts to improve information sharing studied ten barriers that were perceived as a 
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hindrance to the information sharing process. Figure 16 highlights the ten barriers studied 
in the GAO survey and consolidates the average response of 16 federal agencies, 40 state 
agencies, 106 large cities, and 122 small cities to give an average percentage of perceived 
factors that hinder information sharing (Decker and Lepore, 2003). 
 
2 - Lack of clearances
19%
3 - Lack of integrated databases
18%
4 - Legal Barriers
12%
5 - Concerns of disclosing sources 
and methods
12%
7 - Concerns about jeopardizing 
ongoing investigations
6%
8 - Authorities lack interest in 
Information to be provided
1%
9 -Culture of "information 
superiority"
1%
10 - Lack of confidence in ability 
to manage investigations
1%
1 - Difficulty with provision to 
secure, maintain, and destroy 
information
23%
6 - Lack of confidence in ability to 




Figure 16.  Perceived Barriers Preventing Federal Agencies  
from Sharing Information. derived from (Decker and Lepore, 2003) 
 
 
Although the GAO report identified the lack of integrated database capability as the 
only significant barrier, it is interesting to note in Table 9, that the top six out of the ten 





Table 9.  Top Ten Perceived Barriers to Sharing Information (Decker and Lepore, 
2003) 
 
1  Difficulty with provision to secure, maintain, and destroy information* 
2  Lack of clearances* 
3  Lack of integrated databases* 
4  Legal Barriers* 
5  Concerns of disclosing sources and methods* 
6  Lack of confidence in ability to limit disclosure of information* 
7  Concerns about jeopardizing ongoing investigations 
8  Authorities lack interest in Information to be provided 
9 Culture of "information superiority" 
10  Lack of confidence in ability to manage investigations* 
* (Directly related to information assurance / information security values) 
 
 
These emphasize the problems with inconsistencies and different expectations of 
information sharing and information security between organizations. Overcoming barriers 
such as these will continue to test programs such as the USAF GeoBase program, which 
encounters similar challenges when working with internal organizations, joint services, 
local municipalities, civilian employees, and private contractors. Each of these groups is 
representative of the mission and need pieces of the information the others have to share. 
Determining ways to know who it is appropriate to share information with, defining their 
“need to know” and how the information will be used are among the difficulties in 
establishing consistent procedures. 
 
How is GeoBase overcoming sharing barriers?  
The GeoBase program has come a long way very quickly however, we are missing 
a lot in the education details.  The expectation is that information sharing is also in a life 
cycle and willingness will continue to grow as the young company grade officers (CGOs) 
and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) grow up with a better understanding in this type of 
 
 81
open culture.  For now, the GeoBase program is in a life cycle stage where there are many 
senior leaders and data stewards that do not understand the capabilities of the technology 
and potential for both the good and bad.   
 
There are those who do not want information shared in the name of security.  The 
MAJCOM GIOs are finding that their fears are being curbed they more they know about 
the needs to share information and the processes in place to control potential misuse.  It is 
an education process.  Often, the unknowns about security become the scapegoat for not 
accepting change.  Security cannot be an excuse for not wanting to change.  If there is a 
map sharing process were leaking and in need of repair, you do not let it continue to leak 
the same way it has always been with out doing anything about it.  Change is needed.  Just 
because a new technology is introduced does not mean the broken underlying business 
process is fixed.  In this case, GIS helped to highlight the problem and focus attention to 
the process that needs fixing.  For years, maps and information have been walking off the 
installations or can be found publicly on the internet without any kind of control 
mechanisms in place.  Although the perfect solution has not been found, it is better than 
what it was.  There are inherent problems in the system and to be concerned to the point of 
wanting to stop the flow of information now is odd.   
 
Although the Air Force GeoBase policy is to “facilitate sharing GeoBase 
knowledge, to the maximum extent allowable, both across and beyond the installation with 
other federal, state, or municipal agencies” (Zettler, 2002), the policy is very encompassing 
and is difficult to address specific instances.   When the inevitable questions arise at the 
operational level concerning the release of information and the answer is not necessarily 
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clear, the current procedures are to raise the question up the chain of command.  
Installation commander have been given the “responsibility to establish protocols for 
handling their respective installations’ geospatial information to best satisfy their assigned 
missions” (Zettler, 2002).  On occasion, data stewards and requestors reach an impasse and 
MAJCOM GIOs have become good at stepping in to help mediate the solution.  They have 
typically found that problems can be resolved by expressing why data cannot be shared or 
what needs to be done in order to share the information.  Usually, a compromise is reached 
with the data owner and still meets the need of the requestor by stripping out data attributes 
or specific information.  Other times, the MAJCOMs will back the data owner and deny the 
request.  
 
GeoBase administrators understand other’s concerns for not wanting to share 
information.  Just like the GeoBase administrator, they have their concerns about whom 
they give their information to and what they are going to do with it.  There is a lot more 
that can be learned on data sharing from civilian businesses and universities.  Pinpointing 
these barriers in the military, and how they might be overcome, may be a good topic for 
future study.  
 
 
PG4  What are the key information system security constructs and their 
interrelationships? 
 
Information security is so intertwined with the processes, actions, and influences of 
so many things contributing to this nebulous concept of “security”.  Rather than finding 
different aspects of information security specifically associated with geospatial 
information, the interviews, literature review, and policy documents all point back to the 
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standard characterizations of information security and the preservation of three particular 
constructs: “1) confidentiality, ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized 
to have access; 2) integrity: safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of information and 
processing methods; and 3) availability: ensuring that authorized users have access to 
information and associated assets when required” (ISO/IEC 17799, 2000).  Many, if not all, the 
guides and policies for the federal government use these characterizations as their primary 
security objectives and are used to extrapolate risk (potential impact).  Table 10 shows the 
federal information processing standards (FIPS) and how federal information systems, such as 
GeoBase, can begin to categorize these security concepts into discrete impact categories into 
functions of low, moderate, and high risk. 
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Table 10.  Potential Impact Definitions of Security Objectives for Categorization 




These general constructs help to broadly draw direction for Information Security 
(INFOSEC) and Operational Security (OPSEC) policies and procedures.  However, Table 
11 is a compilation different security constructs from multiple courses.  As the GeoBase 
program continues to reach out and interconnect with other information technology 
systems, more security factors must be considered.  By no means is this table complete, nor 
is it meant to be conclusive of all the important constructs.  Instead, it is meant to pull 
together different thoughts from a variety of different fields and areas of expertise that 
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relate to the general security of information.  All too often, organizations focus on only one 
or two aspects of security.  As this table shows, multiple aspects must be incorporated into 
maintaining security.  This table is broken into the primary security requirements of 
technical, operational, and management controls as discussed in Table 4.  
 
Table 11.  Security Constructs  
 
• Access Controls Access Control Policy;  
 
User Access Management: user registration, password management; 
privilege management; review of user access rights; password use; 
unattended user equipment 
 
Network Access Control: policy on use of network services; enforced 
path; user authentification for external connections; node 
authentification; remote diagnostic port protection; segregation in 
networks; network connection protocols; network routing control; 
security of network services 
 
Operating System Access Control:  automatic terminal identification; 
terminal log-on procedures; user identification and authorization; 
password management system; use of system utilities; duress alarm to 
safeguard users; terminal time-out; limitation of connection time. 
 
Application Access Control: information access restrictions; sensitive 
system isolation 
 
Monitoring System Access and Use: event logging; monitoring system 
use; clock synchronization 
 
Mobile computing and teleworking access controls: 
Whether a formal policy is in place, and appropriate security measures 
are adopted to protect against the risk of using mobile computing and 
communication facilities.  
 
(Thiagarajan, 2003; Thiagarajan, 2005) 
 
• Audit and Accountability 
Trails 
 
• Hardware and Systems 
Software Requirements 
“Identify hardware that will be needed to support the interconnection, 
including communications lines, routers, firewalls, hubs, switch, servers, 
and computer workstations. Determine whether existing hardware is 
sufficient, or whether additional components are required, especially if 
future growth is anticipated. If new hardware is required, select products 





“Identify software that will be needed to support the interconnection, 
including software for firewalls, servers, and computer workstations. 
Determine whether existing software is sufficient, or whether additional 
software is required. If new software is required, select products that 
ensure interoperability.” 
(Grance et al, 2002) 
 
• Identification and 
Authentification 
 
• Security Controls “Identify security controls that will be implemented to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the connected systems and 
the data that will pass between them. Controls can be selected from the 
examples provided in Section 4 or from other sources. Controls should be 
appropriate for the systems that will be connected and the environment in 
which the interconnection will operate” (Grance et al, 2002) 
 




• Awareness, Training, and 
Education 
“Define a security training and awareness program for all authorized 
personnel who will be involved in managing, using, and/or operating the 
interconnection. The program may be incorporated into current security 
training and awareness activities. Identify training requirements, 
including frequency and scheduling, and assign  responsibility for 
conducting training and awareness activities. Design training to ensure 
that personnel are familiar with IT security policy, procedures, and the 
rules of behavior associated with the interconnection. Require users to 
sign an acknowledgement form indicating that they understand their 
security responsibilities, if appropriate. If shared applications are used, 
ensure users know how to use them properly. If the interconnection is 
used to exchange or transfer sensitive data, ensure that users understand 
special requirements for handling such data, if required. See NIST 
Special Publication 800-50, Building an Information Technology Security 
Awareness and Training Program, for guidance” (Grance et al, 2002) 
 
 
• Availability “Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information…” [44 
U.S.C., SEC. 3542].  A loss of availability is the disruption of access to 
or use of information or an information system” (Evans et al, 2004). 
 
• Compliance Identification and compliance with applicable leagal requirements; 
intellectual property rights (IPR); safeguarding of organizational records; 
data protection and privacy of personal information; prevention of misuse 
of information processing facility; regulation of cryptographic controls; 
collection of evidence; review of security policies and technical 
compliance.  (Thiagarajan, 2003) 
 
• Confidentiality ““Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and 
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and 
proprietary information…” [44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542].  A loss of 
confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information.” (Evans 




• Configuration Management  
• Contingency Planning “Each organization should have a contingency plan(s) to respond to and 
recover from disasters and other disruptive contingencies that could 
affect its IT system, ranging from the failure of system components to the 
loss of computing facilities. Determine how to notify each other of such 
contingencies, the extent to which the organizations will assist each 
other, and the terms under which assistance will be provided. Identify 
emergency points of contact (POC). Determine whether to incorporate 
redundancy into components supporting the interconnection, including 
redundant interconnection points, and how to retrieve data backups. 
Coordinate disaster response training, testing, and exercises. See NIST 
Special Publication 800-34, Contingency Planning Guide for Information 
Technology Systems, for more information” (Grance et al, 2002) 
 
• Data Element Naming and 
Ownership 
“Determine whether the data element naming schemes used by both 
organizations are compatible, or whether new databases must be 
normalized so the organizations can use data passed over the 
interconnection. In addition, determine whether ownership of data is 
transferred from the transmitting party to the receiving party, or whether 
the transmitting party retains ownership and the receiver becomes the 
custodian. As part of this effort, determine how transferred data will be 
stored, whether data may be re-used, and how data will be destroyed. In 
addition, determine how to identify and resolve potential data element 
naming conflicts” (Grance et al, 2002) 
 
• Integrity / Accuracy 
(System and Information 
Integrity) 
“Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, 
and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and 
authenticity…” [44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542].  A loss of integrity is the 
unauthorized modification or destruction of information”  (Evans et 
al, 2004) 
 
• Data Sensitivity, Asset 
Classification and Control 
“Identify the sensitivity level of data or information resources that will be 
made available, exchanged, or passed one-way only across the 
interconnection. Identifying data sensitivity is critical for determining the 
security controls that should be used to protect the connected systems 
and data. Examples of sensitive data include financial data, personal 
information, and proprietary business data. See NIST Special Publication 
800-18, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Information Technology 
Systems, for further guidance.” 
 
• Documentation  
• Hardware and Systems 
Software Maintenance 
 
• Incident Reporting and 
Response Capability 
“Establish procedures to report and respond to anomalous and suspicious 
activity that is detected by either technology or staff. Determine when 
and how to  notify each other about security incidents that could affect 
the interconnection. Identify the types of information that will be 
reported, including the cause of the incident, affected data or programs, 
and actual or potential impact. In addition, identify types of incidents that 
require a coordinated response, and determine how to coordinate 
response activities. It might be appropriate to develop a joint incident 
response plan for this purpose. For more information, see NIST Special 
Publication 800-3, Establishing a Computer Security Incidence Response 
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Capability (CSIRC), and Federal Computer Incident Response Center 
(FedCIRC) publications” (Grance et al, 2002) 
 
• Level and Method of 
Interconnection 
“Define the level of interconnectivity that will be established between the 
IT systems, ranging from limited connectivity (limited data exchange) to 
enterprise-level connectivity (active sharing of data and applications). In 
addition, describe the method used to connect the systems (dedicated line 
or VPN).” 
 
• Maintenance  
• Media Protection / Data 
Backup 
“Determine whether data or information that is passed across the 
interconnection must be backed up and stored. If backups are required, 
identify the types of data that will be backed up, how frequently backups 
will be conducted (daily, weekly, or monthly), and whether backups will 
be performed by one or both parties. Also, determine how to perform 
backups, and how to link backups to contingency plan procedures. 
Critical data should be backed up regularly, stored in a secure off-site 
location to prevent loss or damage, and retained for a period approved by 
both parties. Similarly, audit logs should be copied, stored in a secure 
location, and retained for a period approved by both parties” (Grance et 
al, 2002) 
 
• Personnel Security Security in job definition, resourcing, and responsibilities; personnel 
screening policy; confidentiality agreements; terms and conditions of 
employment; user training; reporting, responding and learning of 
incidents, weaknesses, and malfunctions; disciplinary process 
(Thiagarajan, 2003) 
 
• Physical and Environmental 
Security 
Physical security, such as the separate network, locks, safes, secure 
rooms, etc. that support that system; maintaining a physical security 
perimeter, physical entry controls, securing offices, rooms and facilities, 
secure working environment, isolated delivery and loading areas.   
 
Equipment Security: equipment siting protection, power supplies, cabling 
security, equipment maintenance, securing of equipment off-premises 
(TDY, etc), secure disposal or re-use of equipment 
 
General: clearing desk and clear screen polcies, removal of property  
(Thiagarajan, 2003) 
 
• Production, Input/Output 
Controls 
 
• Rules of Behavior “Develop rules of behavior that clearly delineate the responsibilities and 
expected behavior of all personnel who will be authorized to access the 
interconnection. The rules should be in writing, and they should state the 
consequences of inconsistent behavior or noncompliance. The rules 
should be covered in a security training and awareness program” (Grance 
et al, 2002) 
 
• Services and Applications “Identify the information services that will be provided over the 
interconnection by each organization and the applications associated with 
those services, if appropriate. Examples of services include e-mail, file 
transfer protocol (FTP), RADIUS, Kerberos, database query, file query, 
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and general computational services” (Grance et al, 2002) 
 
• Systems Development and 
Maintenance 
The analysis and specification of security requirements 
• Impact on Existing 
Infrastructure and 
Operations 
“Determine whether the network or computer infrastructure currently 
used by both organizations is sufficient to support the interconnection, or 
whether additional components are required (e.g., communication lines, 
routers, switches, servers, and software). If additional components are 
required, determine the potential impact that installing and using them 
might have on the existing infrastructure, if any. In addition, determine 
the potential impact the interconnection could have on current operations, 
including increases in data traffic; new training requirements; and new 
demands on system administration, security, and maintenance” (Grance 
et al, 2002) 
 
• User Community “the community of users who will access, exchange, or receive data 
across the interconnection. Determine whether users must possess certain 
characteristics corresponding to data sensitivity levels, such as 
employment status or nationality requirements, and whether background 
checks and security clearances are required.3 Devise an approach for 
compiling and managing the profiles of all users who will have access to 
the interconnection, including user identification, workstation addresses, 
workstation type, operating system, and any other relevant information. 
Each organization should use this information to develop and maintain a 
comprehensive database of its users” (Grance et al, 2002) 
 
MANAGEMENT CONTROLS 
• Business Continuity 
Management 
“Examining the buisiness continuity processes, analyisis of impacts; 
writing and implementing a continuity plan and framework; testing, 
maintaining and re-assessing the plan” (Thiagarajan, 2003) 
 
• Certification, Accrediation, 
and Security Assements 
 
• Change Management “Determine how to coordinate the planning, design, and implementation 
of changes that could affect the connected systems or data, such as 
upgrading hardware or software, or adding services. Establish a forum 
with appropriate staff from each organization to review proposed changes 
to the interconnection, as appropriate. Coordinating change management 
activities will reduce the potential for implementing changes that could 
disrupt the availability or integrity of data, or introduce vulnerabilities” 
(Grance et al, 2002) 
 




• Communications and 
Operations Management 
 
• Costs and Budgeting “Identify the expected costs required to plan, establish, and maintain the 
interconnection. Identify all associated costs, including labor, hardware, 
software, communications lines, applications, facilities, physical security, 
training, and testing. Also, identify costs for certifying and accrediting 
the interconnection after it is established, if appropriate. Develop a 
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comprehensive budget, and determine how costs will be apportioned 
between the parties, if required” (Grance et al, 2002) 
 
• Life Cycle  
• Planning  
• Review of Security Controls 
and Policies 
 
• Risk Assessment  
• Risk Management  
• Roles and Responsibilities “Identify personnel who will be responsible for establishing, maintaining, 
or managing the interconnection, including managers, system 
administrators, application designers, auditors, security staff, and 
specialists from such fields as insurance and risk management. Choose 
personnel who have appropriate subject matter expertise. If contractors 
are involved, one or both organizations may be required to develop a 
nondisclosure agreement to safeguard the confidentiality and integrity of 
exchanged data” (Grance et al, 2002) 
 
• Scheduling “Develop a preliminary schedule for all activities involved in planning, 
establishing, and maintaining the interconnection. Also, determine the 
schedule and conditions for terminating or reauthorizing the 
interconnection. For example, both parties might agree to review the 
interconnection every 12 months to determine whether to reauthorize it 
for continued operation” (Grance et al, 2002) 
 
• Organizational Security  
• Security Policy  
• Segregation of Duties  
• System Security Plan  
• Systems and Services 
Acquisition 
 
• Usefulness “Consider the usefulness of the geospatial information to adversaries to 
include assessing the local threat environment, and installation 
vulnerability assessments” (Zettler, 2002) 
 
derived from (Evans et al, 2004; Grance et al, 2002; Information Security Oversight Office, 
2006; ISO/IEC 17799, 2000; Thiagarajan, 2003; Thiagarajan, 2005) 
 
The case study did show that there was a need to identify security elements for the 
GeoBase program to assist with self-assessments and annual program reviews.  Perhaps 
these constructs will provide additional thoughts on how to assess and develop metrics for 
measuring security successes throughout the different commands.  Sharing lessons learned 
from these types of subject areas can only help to improve confidentiality, integrity, and 





PG5  What are the impacts of information security on information sharing within the 
GeoBase community? 
 
Research question PG3 addressed the different information security concerns and 
how these barriers can get in the way of sharing information.  Question PG5 will explore 
information sharing within the context of the GeoBase community in order to gain a better 
understanding of its impacts on information security.  Six questions help to bring 
understanding of who uses and shares geospatial information within the Air Force and 
provide insight into the security requirements and controls needed for providing security.   
The six questions we will explore using interviews, observations, and archived 
documents in this section are: 1) Whom are we sharing geospatial information with?  2) 
What is the geospatial information used for?  3) How are we sharing geospatial 
information?  4) Who are the primary GeoBase customers using and sharing geospatial 
information?  5) What are the impacts of sharing geospatial information? moreover  6) 
How do security concerns affect information sharing? 
 
 
Whom are we sharing geospatial information with? 
Installations do not operate in a vacuum and therefore cannot be expected to divorce 
itself from the local community.  Users all over the base and local communities depend on 
information from each other for emergency, disaster response, and community planning 
efforts, open communication is needed and a trusting collaborative environment is required.  
GeoBase has fostered an open culture based on the benefits of information sharing.  When 
asked about whom information is shared with, the answer comes back just shy of everyone.  
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Information is shared widely across different organizations and mission functions at the 
installations, up and down the chain of command amongst the different levels of an 
individual service, across the services, with other parts of the Department of Defense 
(DoD) and other federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments, typically at a 
minimum classification of FOUO.  (Headquarters Air Force Geo Integration Office, 2006).  
To varying degrees, the Air Force also shares its geospatial data assets with our allied 
governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), universities, and commercial 
sector contractors (Lachman, 2006).   
One command noted that over the Air Force Portal they reach 600,000 to 800,000 
users and receive in upwards of 350,000 hits per week to view the 16 common installation 
pictures (CIPs) posted.  Although they have not been able to separate out the type of users 
by Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) or general organization, they are getting back 
statistical reports that are becoming more useful, such as determining what areas and 
functions of the map and information have been most demand.  If something happened 
where they needed to identify someone individually, they could.  Over the SIPRnet, 
MAJCOMs can track unique individual users and know what they are doing on the map, 
such as calculating the parking area of an apron at Base X.   
 
What is the geospatial information used for? 
Ms. Beth Lachman, and her team at RAND National Defense Research Institute, is 
conducting research on “Assessing the Impacts of Sharing Geospatial Data Assets Across 
the Department of Defense (DoD)” (Lachman, 2006).    In preliminary studies, her team 
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has identified 13 mission data uses, in Figure 17, associated with the base (shown in green) 
and another four uses associated more closely with warfighting (shown in blue). 
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Figure 17.  Multiple Mission Uses of Installation & Environment (I&E)  (Lachman, 2006) 
 
 
The following list (see Table 12 below) is a brainstorm of ideas and activities that 
include both actual and potential uses of what geospatial information is or could provide.  
These uses denote just the tip of the iceberg, but give an idea of the depth and breadth of 




Table 12.  Potential Uses of Geospatial Information 
Wing Staff  
Facilities Database (XPR)  
Facility Treaty Inspection Areas (CCT)  
Future Modification Plans (XPR)  
Jurisdiction Maps (JAG)  
Radio Frequency Footprint (XPR)  
Range Site Codes (Range Ops)  
Real Property Database (START Insp Bldgs) (CCT)  
START Reports (CCT)  
Courtroom litigation (gather, analyze, present 
geographically-referenced evidence) (JAG) 
Congregation Demographic, Outreach (HC) 
Historic District Mapping (HO) 
Historic Event Locations (HO) 
Tying Key Event Details to Map Locations (HO) 
Relating Date-Stamped Photos to Map Locations (HO) 
Inspection Preparation Activities (IG) 
Public Announcements, Newspaper Mapping Requirements 
(PA) 
FOL Deployment Intel Briefings (A2) 
Daily Intel Briefs (A2) 
3-D modeling for flood management and tidal wave planning 
Analysis for emergency operation and evacuation plans 
Emergency planning for special events  




Explosive Storage Locations (SE / LG) 
Explosive Haul Routes Routes (SE) 
Bird Air Strike Hazards (BASH) Management (SE) 
Confined Space Locations (SE) 
Explosive Safety Quantitative Distance (ESQD Arcs) Zone 
Maps/Explosive Permits (SE)  
TERPS (on base and off base airfield obstructions) 
Toxic Hazard Corridors (SE)  
Base Evacuation Plan (SE)  
Destruct Zones (SE)  
Impact Limit Lines (SE)  
Real Property Database (Penetrability) (SE) 
Railroad Traffic (SE) 
Off-Shore Oil Area Parcel Grids (SE)  
 
 
Operations Group  
Visualize Airfield Features, Obstructions, etc. to Aircrew 
NOTAM Maps 
Imaginary Surfaces/Aerodrome 
Flight Corridors (DOJ)  
Flight Path Maps (DOJ)  
ILS Area Definition (DOJ)  
Meteorology Tower Locations (DOW)  
Meteorology Data (DOW)  
Real Property Database (Range Bldgs) (Range)  
RF Frequencies (Range)  
Risk Assessment Codes (SE)  
Safety Equipment Inventory (SE)  
Safety Inspection/Audit File (SE)  
Seismic Data (DOW)  
Special Use Airspace (DOJ)  
Terminal Instrument Approach Procedures (DOJ)  
Toxic Hazard Corridors (DOW)  
Airspace Boundaries (Range)  
Antenna/Radar Tower Database (Range)  
Critical Launch Facilities List (Range)  
Elevations (LOS) (Range)  
Aircraft Data 
Aircraft Parking 
Fuel Pit Status 
Mission Schedules 
Air Show Planning 
Integration with the other systems: GDSS, Global Procedures 
System (TERPS), FalconView, Aircrew Portal, CAMPS, 
TBMCS-UL, JOPES, SMS 
 
 
Logistics Group       
Real-Time Location of People and Cargo on the Installation, 
Location of Aircraft on Ramp and Readiness/Maintenance 
Status, ESSP/BSP 
Aircraft Parking and Status (integrated with Geo81 and 
CAMS) 
GFE Equipment (LSS)  
HAZMAT Pharmacy (LSS)  
Hypergolic Fuels Database (LSS)  
Hypergolic Process Safety Inspections (LSS)  
Standard Base Supply System (LSS)  
Integration with other systems:  G081/CAMS, LOGCAT 
(EKB/STEP), LOGMOD?, PAX Systems (Passenger 




Flight Health  
Injuries/Illness Report  
Monitoring Data (DW)  
Occupational Risk Assessments  
Drinking Well Locations 
Air Models 
Mold Surveys 
Disease Mapping (Public Health) 
Water Sampling and BioHazard Points/Results 





Security Forces    
Restricted Areas (SF)  
Building Security Features (SF) 





Comm Infrastructure Locations 
Mass Notification Systems Coverage Areas 
Office Location Linked to GAL  
Cable TV (SC)  
Communication Lines (SC)  




Recreational Facilities List (SVS)  
AAFES Locations (AAFES) 
Golf Course Management (SVS) 
Golf Course Irrigation (SVS) 
Fitness Center, jogging routes (SVS) 
Management of Self Storage Lot / Lemon Lot (SVS) 




SVS-Produced Lodging Guest Maps (SVS) 
 
Engineering & Base Development      
Base Layout Map (CEC)  
Building Centroids (CEC)  
Building Location and Height (CEC)  
Building Maintenance (CEC)  
Jurisdiction Maps (CEC)  
Land Use/Zones (CEC)  
Landscaping Plan (CEC)  
Crash Grids (CEC)  
Demographic Data(Occupancy)  (CEC)  
5-Yr Future Construction Map (CEC) 
Topography (CEC)  
Traffic Logs (CEC)  
Transportation Routes (CEC)  
Aerial Photography (CEC)  
ACES-PM Data (CEC) 
Historical Aerial Photography (CEC)  
AICUZ (Noise Contours) (CEC)  
Work Order Request (AF Form 332) (CEO) 
AF Form 1391 (CEC) 
Dig Permits (AF Form 103) (CEO) 
Landfill Records (CEO)  
Lightning Protections (CEO)  
Monitoring Data (Landfills) (CEO)  
Pavement Management (CEO)  
Pesticide Management Plan (CEO)  
1-2 Yr Planned Construction/Renovation (CEO)  
Refrigerants (ODCs) Database (CEO)  
Service Contracts (CEO)  
Utilities (CEO) 
Linked System Map to Media Files (.mpg) Showing Videos 
From Inside Sewer System 
Feature Location (Valves, Manholes, Transformers, etc) 
Water Distribution (CEO)  
Sanitary System (CEO) 
Wastewater / Storm System (CEO) 
High Temperature Hot Water System (CEO) 
Liquid Fuels System (CEO) 
Electrical System (CEO) 
Natural Gas System (CEO) 
Snow Removal (CEO) 
WIMS HW Management Module (CEO) 
Facility Manager Information (CEO)  
Lead and Asbestos Surveys (CEO / CEV) 
Roof Inspections (CEO) 
Track Installation Damage Assessment (Airfield & Facilities) 
(CEO) 
UXO Cordon Areas (CED) 
NBC Detector Locations and Status (CEX) 
Plot Chemical Release plumes (CEX) 
 
Resources              
Floor Plans (CEC / CER)  
Mineral Resource Management Plan (CER)  
Economic Data (CER)  
Demolition Plan (CER)  
Real Property Database (CER)  
Real Property Database  (% Utilization) (CER)  
Real Property Database (Building Use) (CER)  
Real Property Database (useable life of buildings) (CER)  
Facility Category Codes (CER) 
Space Utilization Management (CER) 
 
Fire Department 
 Emergency Dispatch (Visual Control) (CEF) 
Combined Dispatch Use (CEF / SFS / MDG ER) 
Earthquake Fault Maps (CEC) 
Fire Evacuation Plan (CEF)  
Fire History (CEF) 
Digital Pre-Fire Plans (CEF)  
Fire Hydrant Test Data File (CEF)  
Monoco Fire Alarm System integration (CEF / CEO) 
Floor Plans (Alarms, Hydrants) (CEF / CEC) 
HAZMAT Routes (CEF)  




Environmental              
Ground Cover Maps (CEV)  
Hazardous Waste Sampling Data (CEV)  
Hazardous Waste Tracking System (CEV)  
HAZMAT Plan (CEV)  
Hazardous Materials Management (Pesticides, ODS, PCB 
mapping) 
Historical Water Table Data (CEV)  
Hunting/Fishing Maps (CEV)  
Industrial Waste Loadings (CEV)  
IRP Site Maps/Reports (CEV)  
Landfill Loading Records (CEV)  
Artifact Photos (CEV)  
Asbestos Survey Database (CEV)  
Background Concentrations (CEV)  
Monitoring Data (Air) (CEV)  
Contaminated Soil Locations (CEV) 
Monitoring Data (Soil) (CEV)  
Monitoring Well Locations (CEV)  
Natural Resources Study Areas/Data (CEV)  
NPDES Permits (CEV)  
Opportunity Assessments for PP (CEV)  
Chem Hazard Emerg Response Plans (CEV)  
Coastal Zone Management Plans (CEV)  
Depth to Groundwater (CEV)  
Endangered and sensitive Species (CEV)  
Invasive species monitoring (CEV) 
Environmental Project List (CEV)  
Prime and Unique Farm Lands (CEV)  
Process Waste Quantities (CEV)  
PSD Station (Air Monitor) Locations (CEV)  
Resources (Natural, Cultural, Historical) (CEV)  
SPCC- UST  (CEV)  
Species Maps/Lists (CEV)  
Tank Database (CEV)  
TIP Tape - ‘76 Vegetation Study (CEV)  
TSDF Permits (CEV)  
Vegetation Fuel Age Class (CEV)  
Vegetation Maps (CEV)  
Vent Stacks on Pads (CEV)  
Waste Maintenance Tracking System (CEV)  
Waste Profiles (SB14)  
Waste Stream Analysis (CEV)  
Waste Stream Data  
Water Quality Reports (IWTP)  
Wetlands (CEV)  
Ambient Air Quality Data (CEV)  
Ambient Water Quality Locations (CEV) 
Water management (3-D modeling of runoff) 
Flood management 
Watershed modeling of burn area from accidental fire 
Incinerator analysis 
Natural resource management 
Cultural resources, archeological mapping  
Encroachment analysis with aerial imaging overlays 





How are we sharing geospatial information? 
With as many different uses and sharing relationships exist, there are equally as 
many ways in which to physically use and share information.  The internet and intranet 
are the primary means to share data.  A6 (Communications) has established network 
protocols that allow network controls.  The network essentially controls the gateway 
through which information is shared.  Web viewers such as ArcIMS, a popular Internet 
Mapping Service with the GeoBase community, and ESRI’s solution for delivering 
dynamic maps and GIS data and services via the Web.  It provides a highly scalable 
framework for GIS Web publishing that meets the needs of corporate Intranets and 
demands of worldwide Internet access” (ESRI, 2006).  These web services provide the 
GIS viewing capabilities for the average non-GIS familiar users without the use of 
expensive standalone GIS software.  For the majority of the GeoBase users across the 
installation, web viewers provide both accessibility and functionality.  For those users 
who require a more sophisticated analysis and editing tool, they turn towards GIS desktop 
applications, such as ArcView, ArcInfo, ArcAnalyst, ArcGIS or ArcMap (ESRI’s 
desktop GIS software used by the Air Force).  Other methods in which information is 
shared is over the non-web based network systems, such as shared drives and folders; the 
“sneaker net” method, using mobile storage media (CDs, DVDs, floppy disks, thumb 
drives, etc.) to move and share information from one user or location to another.  Table 




Table 13.  Information Sharing Methods and Concerns 
 
Sharing Method  
(Lachman, 2006:10) 
GeoBase Example Security Concern 
Web Viewer - ArcIMS Web sever (via 
the Air Force Portal) 
 
Desktop Application - ArcGIS  




Sneaker-net (Mobile Media) - Floppy disks 
- CD / DVDs 
- Thumb drives 
- Mobile hard drives 
- MP3 players 
 




- Image files (.jpgs, tiffs) 
- Email attachments 
 
Video and Simulators - Video files (.mpgs)  
Field technology applications -   
Specialized mission studies - Mission reports 
- Conferences 




Who are the primary GeoBase customers using and sharing geospatial information? 
It is interesting to map the spread of geospatial information as users GeoBase 
program reaches out to new users or vice versa.  As discussed in chapter two, the 
GeoBase program grew out of the Civil Engineering community as a Wing mission 
support program.  In the early stages, geospatial information centered on civil 
engineering type information such as the common installation picture (CIP) type of 
information.  Since the Air Force environmental flight had a history and experience using 
GIS information, environmental was one of the first to align themselves with GeoBase.  
Because of this early adoption and continued organizational support, the now robust 
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environmental mission data sets receive much attention. Several commands now employ 
dedicated staff to manage the demand for environmental information.  Other early 
adopters were the emergency responders, particularly the fire, security forces, and 
readiness communities.  The graphic below (Figure 18) illustrates the geospatial 
information centers of gravity within the Air Force.  This graphic shows the relationships 
and magnitude of key information users.   
 


























































Figure 18.  Air Force Geospatial Centers of Gravity 
 
 
Notice how the nucleus of the information centered close to the operations of the mission 
and focused around the primary users of the installation warfighting platform.  On the 
periphery, are the secondary users, the operations support centers, other services and 
organizations who have vested interests, information providers such as National 
Geointelligence Agency (NGA) and the Intelligence communities, as well as the 
 
 99
expertise and skills of contractors and non-governmental agencies which the installations 
rely.  This later center of gravity notes an area of concern and will be discussed in more 
detail in another section.  
 
The following graph (see Figure 19 below), from the RAND study, shows the 
distribution of users on one installation’s ArcIMS web server and supports the above 




Figure 19.  Case Study of Ramstein AB ArcIMS (Lachman, 2006) 
 
 
































If we can accept this installation as stereotypical of users across the command at 
other installations, then the conclusions on the primary GeoBase customers and users can 
be validated.  Civil Engineering, Communications, Security Forces are shown as the top 
base-level users, while MAJCOM and higher-headquarters (consisting of fewer users) 
also remain as primary users.  Arguably, as users become more familiar with the tools 
and information available, user’s dependence on this type of information will continue to 
grow, as will threats and vulnerabilities.  See the relationship between user familiarity 








































Figure 20.  Impact of Familiarity with Geospatial Assets on Amount of Information 
Shared and Risk to Security 
 
 
How does sharing information impact risk? 
Vulnerabilities wait at each interchange and as demand for the interconnectedness 
spread, communications squadrons became more heavily involved, both as network 
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infrastructure providers and as customers who found their own benefit to managing 
information geospatially.  As these networks become wider spread, the security controls 























Figure 21.  Information Sharing and Security Risk Relationship 
 
 
What are the impacts of sharing geospatial information? 
 
 Now that we have seen how raising the amount of information shared also raises 
the risk potential.  We know that completely cutting off the flow of information is 
unrealistic, but the tendency to start shutting down and limit the flow often happens 
without consideration of the other affects and benefits of sharing information.  Table 14 














Efficiencies - Cost savings 
- Time savings 
- Manpower impacts 
- Improving contractor oversight 
Effectiveness - Improving operations, decision-making, and 
planning 
- Performing new task that would/could not be 
done before 
Process Improvements - Improving working relationships 
- Improving communications processes 
- Mostly automating a formerly manual process 
- Changing an analysis process 
Affects to the Mission - Policy impacts 
- Educational and training impacts 
- Public relations impact 
- Legal impact 
- Employee morale and productivity affects 
 
 
Particularly in emergency situations, a high demand for information is required early in 
the response so that the right decisions and plans can be put into place.  (MacFarlane, 
2005:19).  Figure 22 shows the typical information demand gap in the demand and 





Figure 22.  Information Demand-Provision Gap following an emergency event (based on 
work by Peter Power, Visor Consultants, 2004) (MacFarlane, 2005:8) 
 
Whereas, Figure 23 depicts how an increase in the availability of information can narrow 
the gap between the need for information and what is available.  
 
Figure 23.  Accelerating information availability to keep closer pace with demand (based 





The shared geospatial information GeoBase provides help narrow this gap in the 
Air Force.  Survival Recovery Centers (SRCs), Damage Control Groups (DCGs), Unit 
Control Centers (UCC), on-scene commanders through GIS and shared information 
networks, such as the Theater Battle Management Control System (TBMCS), a clearer 
situational picture is presented to a variety of decision makers.  Now, instead of waiting 
hours for enough information for command and control to make a decision that it is safe 
to carry on the mission, is now completed with more precision, in much less time, and 
with a higher degree confidence.   
 
 
PG6  What are the costs and benefits of either limiting or providing access to the 
data?  Do they outweigh the risks? 
 
As the concern over information security grows, the tendency seems to be that the 
sharing of information becomes limited, thus reducing the opportunities to synthesize 
information a helpful or a malicious way.  There are costs involved to limit or manage the 
flow of information, both financial and non-monetary (mission) costs. 
 
Financial Investments 
Some experts have tried to calculate the financial costs of putting a classification 
on information.  A 2005 cost report on government security classification done by the 
Information Security Oversight Office (ISSO) reported, “the total security classification 
cost estimates within Government for FY 2005 is $7.7 billion.  This figure represents 
estimates provided by 41 executive branch agencies, including the Department of 
Defense. It does not include, however, the cost estimates of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), which that agency has classified” (Information Security Oversight Office, 
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2006).  Costs were divided into the following security constructs: physical security, such 
as the separate network, locks, safes, secure rooms, etc. that support that system; 
information security, which includes classification management, declassification, and 
information systems security for classified information; professional education, training 
and awareness; security management and planning; and unique miscellaneous items.  
(Information Security Oversight Office, 2006).  Figure 24 breaks out the costs for each 
category, whereas Figure 25 compares the total government costs to that of industry for a 
ten-year period to provide further perspective. 
 
 
Figure 24.  Government Security Classification Costs Estimate Fiscal Year 2005 







Figure 25.  Graph Comparing Total Costs for Government and 
Industry for FY 1995-2005 (Information Security Oversight Office, 2006) 
 
 
“In the past, the costs for the implementation of the programs to classify, safeguard and 
declassify national security information were deemed non-quantifiable, intertwined with 
other overhead expenses. While portions of the program’s costs remain ambiguous, ISOO 
continues to collect cost estimate data and to monitor the methodology used for its 
collection. Requiring agencies to provide exact responses to the cost collection efforts 
would be cost prohibitive. Consequently, ISOO relies on the agencies to estimate the 
costs of the security classification system. The collection methodology has remained 
stable over the past 11 years, providing a good indication of the trends in total cost. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that absent any security classification activity, many 
of the expenditures reported herein would continue to be made in order to address other, 
overlapping security requirements” (Information Security Oversight Office, 2006). 
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 Agencies, such as the Air Force, who invest in the GIS hardware, software, data 
and training understand the potential gains on their return on investment.  Sure, there are 
high upfront costs, but “the level of benefit will be maintained over time as effectiveness 
and efficiency gains are realized” (see Figure 26) (MacFarlane, 2005:82). 
 
 
Figure 26.  Timescale of Costs and Benefits of GIS Investments (MacFarlane, 2005:82) 
 
 
In this section, we have explored a few aspects of different assumed financial 
costs.  The next section will delve into the difficultly of putting a price on the demand for 
answers from information, particularly when the stakes of the questions are high. 
 
Non-Monetary and Mission Benefits 
Although it is unknown just how much it takes to secure the geospatial 
information of the GeoBase program, one can see that there are plenty of fiscal costs 
associated with the elements of security.  Nonetheless, of greater value to the program is 
the understanding of the non-monetary costs of restricting access to customers that cost in 
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incalculable.  The potential of restricted information having far bigger costs than just 
dollar costs are great.  Not only are financial costs involved of things that we can see and 
count, but also there are the “would have” or “could have” costs of what would or could 
have happened if the information were not available when a particular decision was to be 
made.  By keeping information out of the hands that need it could cost millions of dollars 
for an improperly sited building, millions in legal fees for an environmental disaster 
litigation process, or worse the potential of loss of aircraft and human life.  For example, 
if explosive safety Q-D arcs are not shared and a contract is let to construct a building 
inside a Q-D arc, a lot of money is spent in change orders and redesign fees or the base 
inherits a risk to the facilities being inside a safety zone.  On the other hand, knowing 
where the Q-D arcs are and their size, one could figure out what may be stored in that 
area that we do not necessarily want them to know.  It becomes a fine balancing act.  
Another example of restricting information is confining it to the SIPRnet.  SIPRnet is 
much more difficult to use that the NIPRnet and very difficult to deploy with.  The Air 
Force Contingency Response Groups (CRGs) are an example of users of geospatial 
information who face the challenges of how to deal with sensitive information they 
collect for GeoReach. The GeoReach package relies on deploying forward, collecting 
data, and sending it back to the rear using NMARAT, a satellite communications system 
that can provide secure communications up to SECRET level.  There are many reasons to 
keep things unclassified.  Keeping information at a level so that it is readily available for 
use is important to maintain. 
In the end, the cost is to the mission degradation and or mission effectiveness. If 
people cannot get quick access to the information they need, then they are bound to go 
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out and spend money or time to recollect.  This can severely delay mission 






























Figure 27.  Information Restriction and Mission Accomplishment Relationship 
 
  
Conversely, if people can be exposed to the information and know where to go to find it, 
time, money, and manpower can be decreased while increasing mission accomplishment.   
Another example, at one base, someone dealing with the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) maintained the understanding that the identity of base wells were not to be 
released or represented on the map and became concerned when a GeoBase map showed 
a building that housed a water well, a discussion ensued o have it removed.  The historic 
document that was the basis of their understanding did not specify oil wells, water wells, 
drinking wells, etc. The GeoBase map had not annotated the facility identifying the 
facility as a well site. The problem comes in that if there was ever an emergency (fire, 
etc) and the fire department had to respond to that building, how are they going to 
 
 110
respond to it, if it is not on the map?  Eventually, senior leadership took responsibility for 
it and allowed the information to be published. In this case, they were able to come to an 
understanding, but this example brings up two good points.  One we have people out 
there that are appropriately concerned for the welfare of the base and have different 
perspectives of how information should be classified.  The second is that it is important 
for communities with different perspectives to come together, while understanding that 
locking down information and not making it available to people is not the best answer, 
but look holistically at physical, logical, and administrative controls that can be enacted 
to overcome a complex and common goal..   
A key finding in this research is that knowledge management is an important 
element in information security and information sharing.  It is not always about giving 
and sharing the data, it is about sharing the awareness that the data exists.  It is all about 
DATA DISCOVERABILITY.  It is about information awareness and knowing where to 
get it.  It may be available through a website, or speaking to a subject matter expert 
(SME), or the library.   You can certainly restrict data to control better help alleviate 
some of these security concerns, but the problem is that you limit the intent of what the 
whole program is for of disseminate the information take advantage of the data being 
created.  From the ESRI perspective, they want to be able to map the world and provide 
the data to everybody.  That is good, but we must be careful where it may begin to 
interfere with our national security.  There are many places to find information, it may be 




V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions for 
future research.  This exploratory case study only begins to scratch the surface of GIS 
operational security issues.  By no means is this study able to include the magic answer 
on securing geospatial information or the key to opening the door to the challenges of 
information sharing.  It can however, continue, and in some cases begin, the needed 
discussion on these important issues challenging the Air Force community.  Without 
purposeful discussion and awareness of the challenges, we cannot expect to adapt our 
business processes and policies to address to keep up with the constant changes in 
vulnerabilities and threats brought about by time and technology. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Increased use of electronic data sharing denotes a greater chance of information 
misuse, both inside and outside the Air Force. As the repository of critical information 
builds, GeoBase information will face a heightened risk of being targeted through cyber 
terror attacks. The security implications of the USAF GeoBase program are but a subset 
of a growing national dilemma that plagues academics and practitioners. 
We have seen the inevitable swinging of the pendulum from all access and no 
control to the desire for tightly regulated and restricted information security laws, 
policies, and procedures. It is imperative that common and explicit guidelines are 
developed and implemented throughout the USAF and the DoD. There is a need in the 
Air Force to establish a tacit understanding that security of information is important and 
that the costs involved with not maintaining security standards are intolerable based on 
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the understanding of the risk.  If this type of mindset does not exist, then the entire 
organization will continue to remain at risk and experience mission degradation, reduced 
productivity, lost data, revealed military secrets or compromised integrity. Motivating 
airmen and civilian partners to realize these risks and prepare them to treat geospatial 
data they handle as if it is their own banking information will go a long way in protecting 
the missions they serve. Without common standards to dictate minimum-security 
requirements and practices, bases will be left to develop and implement their own 
security standards. As a whole, the organization is only as strong as the weakest link.   
Not only is it imperative to develop policies and procedures for sharing data, but 
it is incumbent upon this community to educate itself on the information that exists today. 
 Information security cannot limit data discovery; rather, it should encourage one's self to 
illuminate new data/information while providing the necessary security blanket that the 
discoveries will remain in the hands of a safe user community.  
There are significant costs; not only financial, but serious mission degradation and 
effectiveness are at stake.  The first step to moving beyond the problem is establishing 
and investing in the appropriate business processes to identify the sensitivity of 
information both on its own and combined with other information.  Today’s solution of 
referring to historical documents, policies, and processes and specific requests by the data 
steward or data layer owner has been a good start, but as the information grows in value 
and becomes more easily accessible through new technologies, these old decisions must 
be rethought as they do not completely address the issues of today’s information 
situation.  Just as the GeoBase service has helped to overcome the stove-piped mentality 
on the map between functional areas through the common vision of “One Base, One 
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Map”, similar hurdles must still be over come in other areas of the organization.  No one 
particular knowledge set will be able to solve this interwoven problem on its own.  We 
need the expertise of many essential communities such as Information security (Infosec), 
Operational security (Opsec), Communications security (Commsec), the GeoBase 
Integration Office (GIO), and the data owners to come together to weave a balanced 
approach.  There is a lot of work ahead, as the environment continuously changes, we 
must be willing to adapt.  People will continue to find the information they need.  If they 
do not have quick access to the information, then they are bound to either make a 
uniformed decision or spend money or time to recollect.  We must keep in mind is that 
these efforts are not just about sharing the data itself, but building the awareness that the 
information exists.  The quest for information security must not limit data discoverability 
and the ability to if not share the information, share that it exists and where it may be 
found.  By actively managing geospatial information and the knowledge it brings we can 
more effectively identify and build the processes and have the best of all three worlds: 
accuracy, accountability, and access.   
Much research is still needed to understand how to find balance between 
information security and the need to share data. A greater understanding of the technical 
side of computer security and the growing threats in cyberspace combined with the 
knowledge of what data providers know about what they provide in their functional area 
will help more efficiently and securely align the GeoBase workflows with Air Force 
Business processes needed for progress. As we become more connected across functional 
areas and between services the more important it become to coordinate our actions and 




Table 15.  Suggestions for Further Study 
 
Proposition Key Implications for Practice Avenues for Future Research 
1 Geospatial Information Sharing Pinpointing barriers to information 
sharing within the culture of the Air 
Force and how they might be 
overcome. 
 
2 GeoBase Metrics A look at how well we have/are 
operationalizing GeoBase.  HAF 
has been collecting an Air Force 
wide inventory from the different 
units at different levels.  What we 
do not have is any type of 
inspection criteria or analysis of 
“best practices”.  Identification of 
common themes which units and 
subsequently major commands and 
IG teams to look for that continue 
to enable the advancement of the 
technology that we’ve invested so 
heavily.   
 
3 GeoBase Returns on Investment: Is 
GeoBase Paying Off? 
Examine the investments made for 
GeoBase and determine a way to 
identify and quantify the returns on 
investment.  Are our up-front costs 
paying off the way we anticipated 
them doing?   
 
4 GeoBase Central Management and 
Funding 
A look at the implementation and 
management of the GeoBase 
program's funding chain.  As 
standards differ from one 
MAJCOM to another, some 
standards may not be on another's 
scope.  Managing an Air Force 
Program without standards and 
sideboards?  How do you transition 
from "as is" to "to-be" without a 
requirement?  It is easier from a 
MAJCOM perspective, if the units 
are funded from that entity.  What 
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is the best way to fund units from 
one source entity or leaving it up to 
the units to fund their own 
programs; regardless, how do you 
set standards and evaluate the 
different set requirements? 
 
5 Expanding GeoBase Centers of 
Gravity 
An examination of the expansion of 
GeoBase beyond the parent 
organization (CE and other 
established centers of gravity).  
Bred within the Civil Engineering 
organization, GeoBase spreads 
beyond the scope of just CE.  Are 
we organizationally postured to 
take advantage of all the 
possibilities that GIS (Information 
Technology) has to offer?  
Organizationally, how do we begin 
to expand that beyond CE into other 
career fields...much like our Field 
Operating Agencies (FOAs), such 
as Comm, Security Forces, AFCEE, 
AFCESA, etc 
 
6 Information Security of Information 
Released to Contractors 
How does giving geodatabase 
information to a contractor compare 
with previously releasing AutoCAD 
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Background 
Technological advancements such as Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and 
the Internet have made it easier and affordable to share information, thus making 
complex and time sensitive decisions with higher levels of confidence. However, the 
sharing of information also increases the likelihood that an adversary can gain illicit 
access to the information. Today's military leaders face challenging decisions on how to 
make geospatial information collected on military installations and organizations 
available to authorized communities of interest while simultaneously restricting access to 
protect operational security. Often, these decisions are made without understanding how 
the sharing of certain combinations of data may pose a significant risk to protecting 
critical information, infrastructure or resources.  Information security has been an area of 
growing concern in the GeoBase community since, by definition, it is required to strike a 
balance between competing interests, each supported by federal policy: (1) the 
availability of data paid for by tax dollars and (2) the protection of data as required to 
mitigate risks.  This research sets out to explore the security implications of the US Air 
Force GeoBase (the US Air Force's applied Geospatial Information System) program. We 
examine the rapid expansion of the use of geospatial information in the military; examine 
the intrinsic and extrinsic security risks of the unconstrained sharing of geospatial 
information; and explore difficulties encountered when attempting to facilitate sharing 
geospatial information sharing while minimizing the associated operational risks. 
 
Key Documents 
• RAND Report, “Mapping the Risks: Assessing the Homeland Security 
Implications of Publicly Available Geospatial Information”. (Baker, 2004) 
• AFIT IMGT 669, “Vulnerability Investigation” (2004) 
• “Evolving Federal Protocols for Safeguarding Geospatial Information” (Cullis) 
• DoD Directive 8500.1, “Information Assurance (IA)”, 24 Oct 2002 
• DoD Directive 8100.1, “Global Information Grid (GIG) Overarching Policy”, 19 
Sept 2002 
• GAO Report, “Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish 
Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but 
Unclassified Information”, Mar 06 
 
 120
• GAO Report, “Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Needs 
to be Strengthened”, Aug 2003 
 
Research Enablers 
This research is being sponsored by the following organizations: 
 
AF/A7CI  (Pentagon) 
Information Resources Management Division, DCS/Installations,  
Logistics & Mission Support 
 
USAF GIS Support Center (USAFA) 




Setting up the interview 
Begin by an initial phone call or introduction email (basic format below) to establish 
contact and explain the purpose of the interview.  Follow up with a phone call and 




My name is Capt Scott Bryant.  I am a student at the Air Force Institute of Technology conducting 
thesis research regarding geospatial information security and information sharing.  Specifically, 
the goal of this research is to identify security and sharing issues regarding geospatial 
information of the USAF GeoBase program and to improve the general understanding of 
importance of balance between securing and sharing information in order to maximize USAF 
mission processes and minimize customer inefficiencies.   
 
I understand you are involved with this process and I would like to conduct an interview to gather 
data for my research.  Please contact me at scott.bryant@afit.edu if you are able to participate 
and we can set up a time convenient for you.  
 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.  I have also included my thesis 
advisor’s contact information below: 
 





Scott A. Bryant, Capt, USAF 
Student, Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) 








Immediately prior to the interview: 
1. Review pertinent information 
 
2. Ensure to have the following information readily available: 
 
a. Reference Folder 
b. Any correspondence previously made with the interviewee 
c. List of Questions / Question Answer Sheet  
d. Laptop and notepad for recording answers 
 
 
At the start of the interview: 
1. Researcher Introduction: “My name is Capt Scott Bryant.  I am a student at the 
Air Force Institute of Technology conducting thesis research regarding geospatial 
information security and information sharing within the US Air Force GeoBase 
program.”   
  
2. Ensure attendees are familiar with the intent and concepts of the research.  Read 
the purpose statement: “the goal of this research is to identify security and sharing 
issues regarding geospatial information of the USAF GeoBase program and to 
improve the general understanding of importance of balance between securing 
and sharing information in order to maximize USAF mission processes and 
minimize customer inefficiencies.”  
 
3. Describe the interview process: “This will be a semi-structured interview.  I have 
a short list of questions, which may lead to additional questions for further 
research or clarification purposes.  Please feel free to interject any information 
you feel may be useful to the research.”   
 
4. Assure anonymity: “I want to remind you that no identifying information obtained 
through this or subsequent interviews will be retained or reported in the final 
thesis. In order to complete the research effort, data collected on individual 
subjects may include duty title and description of/duration in current position, 
which will facilitate analysis and follow up for the duration of this study only. 
Data gathering will be focused on information specific to the USAF GeoBase 
policies and procedures.”  
 
5. Obtain permission for vocal recording (if applicable): “Vocal recording is a useful 
tool to my research so that I may accurately capture the conversation, reducing the 
chance for misinterpretation.  Do I have your expressed permission to record this 
interview?” 
 




7. Ask the appropriate questions, depending on the interviewee 
 
8. Provide interviewees ample time to fully articulate all comments. Wait for 
appropriate pauses to seek clarification and for follow-up questions. Capitalizing 
on the nature of the discussion, allow brainstorming of ideas. Tangential ideas can 
be flushed out as the comments lull. (Oliver, 2004; Swanson et al, 2005.). 
 
Following the interview: 
1. Record interview stop time on record sheet 
 
2. Consolidate all information into Case Study Database (see below) 
 
3. Follow up with an email which should contain the following elements (see 
template below): 
a. Short message thanking the participant for their time 
b. Request for any outstanding information necessary for completing the 
report 
c. Full contact information of researcher and thesis advisor 
d. Assurance they will receive a copy of draft report when complete.   






Thank you for participating in the [telephone] interview conducted on [date].  The 
information you provided will certainly contribute to my research efforts.   
 
As discussed, I would appreciate your assistance in obtaining the following documents: 
[As applicable] 
 
Also, as discussed, I owe you the following information/deliverables:  [As applicable] 
 
In addition, you will receive a copy of the draft thesis for your review prior to publishing.   
 




Scott A. Bryant, Capt, USAF 
Student, Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) 




4. Once the instrument has been completed and all necessary clarification and 
follow-up has been accomplished, type up the interview notes. Send each 
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participant a copy of the notes and request a review. For the review, each 
participant should add any additional comments and correct any errors in content 
or context. Use of Track Changes in MS Word facilitates the investigators review 
and allows copies to be saved for the “chain of evidence”. When the investigator 
receives each reviewed copy, he should note any changes or additions. Edits 
should be discussed, which may spur more discussion. A final opportunity to add 
comments should also be given. (Oliver, 2004). 
 
 
A Guide for the Study Report  
The final case study report will be written in the approved Air Force Institute of 
Technology thesis format. 
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Appendix C: Thesis Research Overview (Sent to Interviewees)  
 
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT
14-Dec-06 2
Geospatial Informational Security 
risks and concerns of 
the U.S. Air Force
GeoBase Program




Geospatial Informational Security risks and 
concerns of the U.S. Air Force GeoBase Program
THESIS PROPOSAL PRESENTATION
Capt Scott A. Bryant, AFIT/ENV
O n e   I n s t a l l a t i o n . . . O n e   M a p
Dr. Michael R. Grimaila (Advisor)
Ass't Prof of Info Mgmt, CISM, CISSP, GSEC Gold
Dept of Systems and Engineering Management 
Dr Alfred Thal (GEM)
Assistant Professor 
Dept of Systems and Engineering Management 
Maj Chris West (GEM)
Assistant Professor 
Dept of Systems and Engineering Management 
Research Enablers: AF/A7CI  (Pentagon)
Information Resources Management Division, 
DCS/Installations, Logistics and Mission Support
USAF GIS Support Center (USAFA)






14-Dec-06 3O n e   I n s t a l l a t i o n . . . O n e   M a p
Abstract
Security Risks in USAF Geospatial Information Sharing
Scott A. Bryant, 
Michael R. Grimaila (Advisor)
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
scott.bryant@afit.edu
michael.grimaila@afit.edu (937)255-3636 (DSN 785-3636) ext 4800 
Technological advancements such as Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and the Internet have made it easier 
and affordable to share information, which enables complex and time sensitive decisions to be made with higher 
confidence.  Further, advancements in information technology have dramatically increased the ability to store, 
manage, integrate, and correlate larger amounts of data to improve operational efficiency.  However, the same 
technologies that enable increased productivity also provide increased capabilities to those wishing to do harm.
Today's military leaders are faced with the challenge of deciding how to make geospatial information collected on 
military installations and organizations available to authorized communities of interest while simultaneously 
restricting access to protect operational security.  Often, these decisions are made without understanding how the 
sharing of certain combinations of data may pose a significant risk to protecting critical information, infrastructure or 
resources.  Information security has been an area of growing concern in the GeoBase community since, by 
definition, it is required to strike a balance between competing interests, each supported by federal policy: (1) the 
availability of data paid for by tax dollars and (2) the protection of data as required to mitigate risks.
In this paper, we explore the security implications of the US Air Force GeoBase (the US Air Force's applied 
Geospatial Information System) program.  We examine the rapid expansion of the use of GeoBase to communities 
outside of the civil engineering field; examine the intrinsic and extrinsic security risks of the unconstrained sharing of 
geospatial information; explore difficulties encountered when attempting to rate the sensitivity of information, discuss 
new policies and procedures that have been implemented undertaken to protect the information, and propose 
technical and managerial control measures to facilitate sharing geospatial information sharing while minimizing the 
associated operational risks.




14-Dec-06 4O n e   I n s t a l l a t i o n . . . O n e   M a p
Primary Research Goal
Improve the general understanding of 
importance of balance between securing
and sharing information in order to 







14-Dec-06 5O n e   I n s t a l l a t i o n . . . O n e   M a p
Secondary Research Goals
1. Improve systemic security design and 
confidence in sharing information 
across geospatial information systems 
(GIS).
2. Provide better understanding of what is 
“appropriate access” to geospatial 
information
3. To strengthen future policies and 
guidance to better safeguard 
information while providing wider 

















14-Dec-06 1O n e   I n s t a l l a t i o n . . . O n e   M a p
Type of Research 
Case Study (Exploratory)
Exploratory Aspect
When discussing “security”, so many 
uncertainties exist.  This research will also 
explore questions and, where possible, 
develop measurement constructs for 
further research in this field. 
Aimed at defining the questions and 
hypotheses of a subsequent study or 
determining the feasibility of the desired 
research procedures (Yin, 2003, pg 5)
Goal may justifiably be to discover theory 
by directly observing social phenomenon 
in its raw form (Yin, 2003, pg 6)
Should be taken at face value (Yin, 2003, pg 7)
Problems may arise if investigator wrongly 
uses data collected as part of an ensuing 
case study (Yin, 2003, pg 7)























Terrorism, Information Technology, and Vulnerability
Knowledge Management
National Map Efforts
Global Information Grid (GIG)
Freedom of Information Act
User Rights and Privledges
Internet Map Servers (IMS)
Data Integration (Security)
DoD Information Policies










1. Improve systemic security design and 
confidence in sharing information across 
geospatial information systems (GIS).
2. Provide better understanding of what is 
“appropriate access” to geospatial 
information
3. To strengthen future policies and 
guidance to better safeguard information 
while providing wider benefits to the 
customer and the mission.
tivati s f r esearc
1. I prove syste ic security design and 
confidence in sharing infor ation across 
geospatial infor ation syste s ( IS).
2. Provide better understanding of what is 
“appropriate access” to geospatial 
infor ation
3. To strengthen future policies and 
guidance to better safeguard infor ation 
hile providing ider benefits to the 
custo er and the ission.
Focused Objectives 
1. To develop a set of general themes and characterizations relating to the 
security of information into integrated geospatial information systems (GIS) 
2. To determine the general themes and characterizations of information sharing
on geospatial information, specifically GeoBase.
3. Assess the availability of USAF GeoBase information (CIP, RIP, and MDS).
4. To develop a conceptual framework capturing the impact of information 
sharing and security concerns on geospatial datasets within military 
installations (USAF GeoBase). 
5. To use an exploratory case study methodology to determine understanding of 
current organizational procedures and identify potential areas for 
improvement.
6. Determine organizational abilities to implement the current guidelines or 
recommended actions to coordinate data restrictions and data requests.
7. Develop / advocate a measurement tool to evaluate the maturity of an 
organization’s GeoBase program and policies/practices to ensure maximum 
security and user potential.
c se  jectives 
1. To develop a set of general the es and characterizations relating to the 
security of infor ation into integrated geospatial infor ation syste s ( IS) 
2. To deter ine the general the es and characterizations of infor ation sharing
on geospatial infor ation, specifically eoBase.
3. Assess the availability of SAF eoBase infor ation ( IP, IP, and S).
4. To develop a conceptual fra e ork capturing the i pact of infor ation 
sharing and security concerns on geospatial datasets ithin i litary 
installations ( SAF eoBase). 
5. To use an exploratory case study ethodology to deter ine understanding of 
current organizational procedures and identify potential areas for 
i prove ent.
6. eter ine organizational abilities to i ple ent the current guidelines or 
reco ended actions to coordinate data restrictions and data requests.
7. evelop / advocate a easure ent tool to evaluate the aturity of an 
organization’s eoBase progra  and policies/practices to ensure axi u  
security and user potential.
Literature Review
1. What is the current GeoBase policy and 
guidance on securing and sharing 
information?  (What are the standard guidelines 
for releasing / publishing data our Airmen should be 
following?)
2. With whom is information shared and who are 
the GeoBase information customers?
3. Explore definitions, constructs, concepts, 
frameworks, and models in related fields of 
interest, such as:
iterat re evie
1. hat is the current eoBase policy and 
guidance on securing and sharing 
infor ation?  ( hat are the standard guidelines 
for releasing / publishing data our Air en should be 
following?)
2. ith ho  is infor ation shared and ho are 
the eoBase infor ation custo ers?
3. Explore definitions, constructs, concepts, 


















(Synthesize Information in Literature Review)
 












• Sensitive / Critical data access controls
• Data protection
• Digital terrorism
• Digital Rights Management
• Information Life Cycle
• Vulnerability Studies





1. Exploratory Case Study
This is also a descriptive case study 
but is aimed at generating 
hypotheses for later investigation 
rather than illustrating. (GAO, 1990)
Its function is to develop the 
evaluation questions, measures, 
designs, and analytic strategy for the 
bigger study. (GAO, 1990, pg 40)
Exploration begins with some sort of 
rationale and direction, even if later 
proven wrong (Yin, 2003, pg 23).
et l y 
iterat re evie
1. Exploratory ase Study
This is also a descriptive case study 
but is ai ed at generating 
hypotheses for later investigation 
rather than illustrating. (GAO, 1990)
Its function is to develop the 
evaluation questions, easures, 
designs, and analytic strategy for the 
bigger study. (GAO, 1990, pg 40)
Exploration begins with so e sort of 
rationale and direction, even if later 
proven wrong (Yin, 2003, pg 23).
Approach to Research Overview
Limitationsi itati sRecommendations for 
Future Research
TBD












1. What is the nature of the security risk 
posed by GeoBase?
2. What information is sensitive that poses a 
risk to security?
3. What impacts might information security 
concerns affect information sharing.
4. What are the key information system 
security constructs and their 
interrelationships?
5. What are the costs and benefits of either 
limiting or providing access to the data?  
Do they outweigh the risks?
ri ary esearc  esti s
1. hat is the nature of the security risk 
posed by eoBase?
2. hat infor ation is sensitive that poses a 
risk to security?
3. hat i pacts ight infor ation security 
concerns affect infor ation sharing.
4. hat are the key infor ation syste  
security constructs and their 
interrelationships?
5. hat are the costs and benefits of either 
li iting or providing access to the data?  
o they out eigh the risks?
Improve the general understanding of importance of 
balance between securing and sharing information.
Overall
Research Goal:











Evaluate support structure 
DoD
MAJCOMs (1 or all)
Unit Level
Establish Scope






Synthesize and Analyze Data
Explore the community’s needs & 





O n e   I n s t a l l a t i o n . . . O n e   M a p
Capt Scott A. Bryant, AFIT/ENV




Dr Michael R. Grimaila
michael.grimaila@afit.edu (937)255-3636 (DSN 
785-3636) ext 4800 




Appendix D: Interview Outline  
 
 
Disclaimer:  The research associated with the interviews conducted during the site visits 
is wholly academic in nature and not connected with any GeoBase reviews, initiatives, or 
staff visits. 
 
Research Background: The researcher is a captain in the AF and a graduate student in the 
Information Resource Management (IRM) program at the AF Institute of Technology. 
As part of the graduation requirements, the researcher must complete a thesis research 
project. The topic chosen, in collaboration with the Headquarters Air Force Geo 
Integration Office (HAF-GIO), concerns the relationship of IRM and GeoBase. The 
primary objective of this research is to: 
 
Improve the general understanding of importance of balance between 
securing and sharing information in order to maximize USAF mission 
processes and minimize customer inefficiencies. 
 
This objective can be explored by identifying information security and sharing issues by 
those with experience in the GeoBase program and relating them to recommended 
information security and sharing practices found in the literature review. 
 
Answers to the following questions should help provide greater insight that will enhance 








2. Duty Title: 




SECTION 2: COMMAND BACKGROUND 
 
1. What is your status on the completion of the Common Installation Picture (CIP)? 
 
2. What Mission Data Sets (MDS) are you currently collecting / managing?  
  
3. How far outside the installation boundary do you maintain as the extent of the Regional 
Information Picture (RIP)? 
a. What data is included in your version of the RIP? 
b. What data is important and would like to include? (wish list) 





SECTION 3:  SECURITY 
 
1. In your own words, what does “information security” mean to you in regards to the GeoBase 
program? 
 
2. How do you currently control access to your current GeoBase data/applications? 
 
3. Do you consider “need to know” before granting access to GeoBase information? 
a. How do you make that determination? 
 
4. In your own experience, what is the biggest information security issue with regards to 
GeoBase data and applications? 
a. What steps are you currently taking to address this? 
 
5. Do you or your office work with classified information? 
a. How is classified information and unclassified information separated? 
b. What are the expected security benefits of restricting access to the information? 
 
6. What are the expected costs of restricting access to the information to either you or your 
customers? 
 





1. Do you have a copy of your local security policy? 
 
2. Are all AF GIS databases documented e.g. command has a central listing)? 
 
3. What contractor hiring practices are employed to ensure security? 
 
4. What type of security awareness training do users receive relating to geospatial information? 
a. May I have a copy? 
 
5. Who are your customers and how often do they use the GIS web server? 
6. How do you identify the responsibilities of organizations that receive or add value to data, or 
of intermediaries such as contractors or host nations? 
 
7. How are data restrictions enforced on these "downstream" users? 
 
8. Is there a systematic review of policies (e.g. inspections)? 





LOGICAL / TECHNICAL CONTROLS 
 
1. What methods are used to identify users who request access to restricted information? 
 
2. How do you permit authorized users to access restricted information? 
 
3. How do users access non-restricted information? 
 
4. Do you log all accesses to the database?  
a. Do you review the logs for any purposes? 
 





1. Where do your servers reside? 
a. Who maintains your servers? 
 
2. Do you have a copy of your disaster recovery plan? 
 
3. How do you recover from a catastrophic system failure? (Physical security - backup plans) 
 
4. How do you recover from a partial system failure? (Physical security - backup plans) 
 
5. Are there any screening measures in place to detect questionable data in the database? 
 
 
SECTION 4:   INFORMATION SHARING 
 
1. Who do you share your information with? (Who depends on your information?) 
 
2. Who do you depend on information from? 
 
3. Have you encountered problems relating to information sharing? 
a. If yes, what kind of problems? 
b. How are you overcoming these problems? 
 
4. How do you determine what information is acceptable for sharing? 
 
5. When you share information, is anything expected in return? 
 








Appendix E: Relative Laws & Executive Orders (1950 to Present) 
 
 
LAW PURPOSE - DESCRIPTION YEAR 
 
The Federal Records Act  
 
 
“The Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended, establishes the framework for 
records management programs in Federal Agencies. As the primary agency 
for records management oversight, the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) is responsible for assisting Federal agencies in 
maintaining adequate and proper documentation of policies and transactions 
of the Federal Government. This is done by appraising records (determining 
record value and final disposition of temporary or permanent records), 
regulating and approving the disposition of Federal records, operating Federal 
Records Centers and preserving permanent records. 
Federal records may not be destroyed-except in accordance with the 
procedures described in Chapter 33 of Title 44, United States Code. These 
procedures allow for records destruction only under the authority of a records 
disposition schedule approved by the Archivist of the United States. NARA 
issues a General Records Schedule (GRS) that gives record descriptions of 
records that are common to most Federal agencies and authorizes record 
disposals for temporary records. The Department is responsible for 
developing agency record schedules-with the approval of the Archivist of the 
United States-that are tailored to our own agency-specific records that are 
not provided for in the GRS.  
Record schedules are mandatory instructions of what to do with records (and 
nonrecord materials) no longer needed for current Government business. The 
records schedules indicate how long a document must be kept before it is 
transferred to a Federal Records Center, destroyed or transferred to NARA for 
permanent preservation. 
The Department's Records Management Program is responsible for ensuring 
that the legal, financial, evidentiary and historical transactions are recorded 
accurately and completely. We must document and preserve the historical 
and nationally important events that have taken place as a result of the 
Department's educational leadership and support.  
As the Department transitions from paper to e-government, we must capture 
and protect all forms of documentation in accordance with Federal laws and 
regulations relating to records management. We must provide and implement 
safeguards against the unlawful removal or loss of the Department's 
information. This is accomplished by using the GRS and the agency's NARA-
approved records disposition schedules for records unique to this agency. 
Such a schedule ensure the systematic disposal of inactive records and the 








The Privacy Act 
 
“The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000), which has been in effect 
since September 27, 1975, can generally be characterized as an omnibus 
"code of fair information practices" that attempts to regulate the collection, 
maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by federal 
executive branch agencies. However, the Act's imprecise language, limited 
legislative history, and somewhat outdated regulatory guidelines have 
rendered it a difficult statute to decipher and apply. Moreover, even after 
more than twenty-five years of administrative and judicial analysis, numerous 
Privacy Act issues remain unresolved or unexplored. Adding to these 
interpretational difficulties is the fact that many Privacy Act cases are 
unpublished district court decisions. A particular effort is made in this 
"Overview" to clarify the existing state of Privacy Act law while at the same 
time highlighting those controversial, unsettled areas where further litigation 














“This Order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and 
safeguarding national security information. It recognizes that it is essential 
that the public be informed concerning the activities of its Government, but 
that the interests of the United States and its citizens require that certain 
information concerning the national defense and foreign relations be 
protected against unauthorized disclosure. Information may not be classified 
under this Order unless its disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause 








Computer Security Act of 1987 
  
 
”Following OMB A-130, The Computer Security Act of 1987 developed 
standards and guidelines to assure [40 USC 0759]: 
 
• Cost-effective security 
• Privacy of sensitive information 
• Standards and guidelines are followed 
• Security plans are developed 
• Mandatory periodic training is conducted 
 
The Computer Security Act also provided a provision to allow agencies to 
waive mandatory FIPS. This waiver provision, in effect, significantly 









The Stafford Act  
 
 
“The Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) 
(Public Law 100-707) is a United States federal law designed to bring an 
orderly and systemic means of federal natural disaster assistance for state 
and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to aid citizens.   
 
The Stafford Act is a 1988 amended version of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 
(Public Law 93-288). It created the system in place today by which a 
Presidential Disaster Declaration of an emergency triggers financial and 
physical assistance through the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).  
 
The Act gives FEMA the responsibility for coordinating government wide relief 
efforts. The Federal Response Plan it implements includes the contributions of 
28 federal agencies and non governmental organizations, such as the 
American Red Cross.  In October 2000, Congress amended it again by passing 








The Government Performance 
and Results Act of 1993 
 
“To provide for the establishment of strategic planning and performance 
measurement in the Federal Government, and for other purposes.  
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled,  
 
Purposes.-The purposes of this Act are to-  
 
(1) improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the 
Federal Government, by systematically holding Federal agencies 
accountable for achieving program results;  
 
(2) initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects in 
setting program goals, measuring program performance against those 
goals, and reporting publicly on their progress;  
 
(3) improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by 
promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and customer 
satisfaction;  
 





plan for meeting program objectives and by providing them with 
information about program results and service quality;  
 
(5) improve congressional decisionmaking by providing more objective 
information on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative 
effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending; and  
 






Executive Order 12829 
 
“Ex. Ord. No. 12829, Jan. 6, 1993, 58 F.R. 3479, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 
12885, Dec. 14, 1993, 58 F.R. 65863, provided:  This order establishes a 
National Industrial Security Program to safeguard Federal Government 
classified information that is released to contractors, licensees, and grantees 
of the United States Government. To promote our national interests, the 
United States Government issues contracts, licenses, and grants to 
nongovernment organizations. When these arrangements require access to 
classified information, the national security requires that this information be 
safeguarded in a manner equivalent to its protection within the executive 
branch of Government. The national security also requires that our industrial 
security program promote the economic and technological interests of the 
United States. Redundant, overlapping, or unnecessary requirements impede 
those interests. Therefore, the National Industrial Security Program shall 
serve as a single, integrated, cohesive industrial security program to protect 











Executive Order 12906 
(Coordinating Geographic 
Data Acquisition and Access: 




“Geographic information is critical to promote economic development, 
improve our stewardship of natural resources, and protect the environment. 
Modern technology now permits improved acquisition, distribution, and 
utilization of geographic (or geospatial) data and mapping. The National 
Performance Review has recommended that the executive branch develop, in 
cooperation with State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector, 
a coordinated National Spatial Data Infrastructure to support public and 
private sector applications of geospatial data in such areas as transportation, 
community development, agriculture, emergency response, environmental 








The Paperwork Reduction Act  
 
 
“The purposes of this subchapter are to— 
 
(1) minimize the paperwork burden for individuals, small businesses, 
educational and nonprofit institutions, Federal contractors, State, local 
and tribal governments, and other persons resulting from the collection 
of information by or for the Federal Government; 
 
(2) ensure the greatest possible public benefit from and maximize the utility 
of information created, collected, maintained, used, shared and 
disseminated by or for the Federal Government; 
 
(3) coordinate, integrate, and to the extent practicable and appropriate, make 
uniform Federal information resources management policies and 
practices as a means to improve the productivity, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of Government programs, including the reduction of 
information collection burdens on the public and the improvement of 
service delivery to the public; 
 
(4) improve the quality and use of Federal information to strengthen 
decisionmaking, accountability, and openness in Government and 
society; 
 





maintenance, use, dissemination, and disposition of information; 
 
(6) strengthen the partnership between the Federal Government and State, 
local, and tribal governments by minimizing the burden and maximizing 
the utility of information created, collected, maintained, used, 
disseminated, and retained by or for the Federal Government; 
 
(7) provide for the dissemination of public information on a timely basis, on 
equitable terms, and in a manner that promotes the utility of the 
information to the public and makes effective use of information 
technology; 
 
(8) ensure that the creation, collection, maintenance, use, dissemination, and 
disposition of information by or for the Federal Government is consistent 
with applicable laws, including laws relating to— 
 
(A) privacy and confidentiality, including section 552a of title 5; 
(B) security of information, including the Computer Security Act of 1987 
(Public Law 100-235); and 
(C) access to information, including section 552 of title 5; 
 
(9) ensure the integrity, quality, and utility of the Federal statistical system; 
 
(10) ensure that information technology is acquired, used, and managed to 
improve performance of agency missions, including the reduction of 
information collection burdens on the public; and 
 
(11) improve the responsibility and accountability of the Office of 
Management and Budget and all other Federal agencies to Congress and 
to the public for implementing the information collection review process, 
information resources management, and related policies and guidelines 





Executive Order 12951 
(Release of Imagery Acquired 





This order prescribes a comprehensive and exclusive system for the public 
release of imagery acquired by space-based national intelligence 
reconnaissance systems.  This order is the exclusive Executive order 
governing the public release of imagery for purposes of section 52(b)(1) of 
the Freedom of Information Act.  
 
Provides release for certain scientifically or environmentally useful imagery 
acquired by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems, 
consistent with the national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:  
 
Section 1.  Public Release of Historical Intelligence   
         Imagery.  Imagery acquired by the space-based national   
         intelligence reconnaissance systems known as the Corona, Argon,   
         and Lanyard missions shall, within 18 months of the date of this   
         order, be declassified and transferred to the National Archives   
         and Records Administration with a copy sent to the United States   
         Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior consistent   
         with procedures approved by the Director of Central Intelligence   
         and the Archivist of the United States.  Upon transfer, such   
         imagery shall be deemed declassified and shall be made available   
         to the public.  
 
Section 2.  Review for Future Public Release of Intelligence   
         Imagery.  (a)  All information that meets the criteria in   
         section 2(b) of this order shall be kept secret in the interests   
         of national defense and foreign policy until deemed otherwise   
         by the Director of Central Intelligence.  In consultation with the   
         Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central   
         Intelligence shall establish a comprehensive program for the   
         periodic review of imagery from systems other than the Corona,   
         Argon, and Lanyard missions, with the objective of making   
         available to the public as much imagery as possible consistent   
         with the interests of national defense and foreign policy.   
         For imagery from obsolete broad-area film-return systems other   
         than Corona, Argon, and Lanyard missions, this review shall   
         be completed within 5 years of the date of this order.  Review of   





         Intelligence deems to be obsolete shall be accomplished according   
         to a timetable established by the Director of Central   
         Intelligence.  The Director of Central Intelligence shall report  
         annually to the President on the implementation of this order.  
 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo12951.htm) 
          
 
The National Technology 
Transfer and Advancement Act 
of 1995  
 
 
“United States Public Law 104-113, was signed into law March 7, 1995. The 
Act amended several existing acts and mandated new directions for federal 
agencies with the purpose of: 
• bringing technology and industrial innovation to market more 
quickly  
• encouraging cooperative research and development between 
business and the Federal government by providing access to federal 
laboratories  
• making it easier for businesses to obtain exclusive licenses to 
technology and inventions that result from cooperative research 
with the Federal government  
The Act made a direct impact on the development of new industrial and 
technology standards by requiring that all Federal agencies use privately 









The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996  
 
 
Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) of 1996 provides that the government information 
technology shop be operated exactly as an efficient and profitable business 
would be operated. Acquisition, planning and management of technology 
must be treated as a "capital investment." While the law is complex, all 
consumers of hardware and software in the Department should be aware of 
the Chief Information Officer's leadership in implementing this statute. 
CCA emphasizes an integrated framework of technology aimed at efficiently 
performing the business of the Department. Just as few businesses can turn a 
profit by allowing their employees to purchase anything they want to do any 
project they want, the Department also cannot operate efficiently with 
hardware and software systems purchased on an "impulse purchase" basis 
and installed without an overall plan. All facets of capital planning are taken 
into consideration just as they would be in private industry:  
• cost/benefit ratio  
• expected life of the technology  






The Freedom of Information 
Act and the Electronic 
Freedom of Information Act 
Amendments of 1996 
 
 
The Freedom of Information Act (1) generally provides that any person has a 
right, enforceable in court, to obtain access to federal agency records, except 
to the extent that such records (or portions of them) are protected from 
public disclosure by one of nine exemptions or by one of three special law 
enforcement record exclusions. 
Enacted in 1966, and taking effect on July 4, 1967, the FOIA firmly 
established an effective statutory right of public access to executive branch 
information in the federal government. The principles of government 
openness and accountability underlying the FOIA, however, are inherent in 
the democratic ideal: "The basic purpose of [the] FOIA is to ensure an 
informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to 
check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the 
governed." (2) The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that only 
"[o]fficial information that sheds light on an agency's performance of its 
statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose."  









Rehabilitation Act, Sec. 508, 
Electronic and Information 
Technology 
 
“Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to require Federal agencies to 
make their electronic and information technology accessible to people with 
disabilities. Inaccessible technology interferes with an individual's ability to 
obtain and use information quickly and easily. Section 508 was enacted to 
eliminate barriers in information technology, to make available new 
opportunities for people with disabilities, and to encourage development of 
technologies that will help achieve these goals. The law applies to all Federal 
agencies when they develop, procure, maintain, or use electronic and 
information technology. Under Section 508 (29 U.S.C. ‘ 794d), agencies must 
give disabled employees and members of the public access to information 







The Government Paperwork 
Elimination Act of 1999  
 
 
“The Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA, Pub. L. 105-277) 
requires that, when practicable, Federal agencies use electronic forms, 
electronic filing, and electronic signatures to conduct official business with the 
public by 2003. In doing this, agencies will create records with business, legal 
and, in some cases, historical value. This guidance focuses on records 
management issues involving records that have been created using electronic 
signature technology. It supplements the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) guidance for agencies implementing the GPEA, as well as other 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) guidance.  
 
This guidance discusses the records management principles that apply to 
electronic signature technology generally. Electronic signatures may be 
accomplished by several different technologies, such as Personal Identification 
Number (PIN), digital signatures, smart cards and biometrics. If additional 
technology-specific records management guidance is necessary, NARA will 









USA PATRIOT Act 
 
 
“H.R.3162: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 
(Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate) 
 
“An Act  to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the 








Government Act of 2002 
 
“Today I have signed into law H.R. 2458, the "E-Government Act of 2002." 
This legislation builds upon my Administration's expanding E-Government 
initiative by ensuring strong leadership of the information technology 
activities of Federal agencies, a comprehensive framework for information 
security standards and programs, and uniform safeguards to protect the 
confidentiality of information provided by the public for statistical purposes. 
The Act will also assist in expanding the use of the Internet and computer 
resources in order to deliver Government services, consistent with the reform 
principles I outlined on July 10, 2002, for a citizen-centered, results-oriented, 
and market-based Government.  
 
 Title II of this Act authorizes agencies to award "share-in-savings" contracts 
under which contractors share in the savings achieved by agencies through 
the provision of technologies that improve or accelerate their work. The 
executive branch shall ensure, consistent with applicable law, that these 
contracts are operated according to sound fiscal policy and limit authorized 
waivers for funding of potential termination costs to appropriate 
circumstances, so as to minimize the financial risk to the Government.  
 
Title III of this Act is the Federal Information Security Management Act of 
2002. It is very similar to title X of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which 
also bears the name Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 
and which I signed into law on November 25, 2002. I am signing into law the 






there is no indication that the Congress intended the E-Government Act to 
provide interim provisions that would apply only until the Homeland Security 
Act took effect. Thus, notwithstanding the delayed effective dates applicable 
to the Homeland Security Act, the executive branch will construe the E-
Government Act as permanently superseding the Homeland Security Act in 
those instances where both Acts prescribe different amendments to the same 
provisions of the United States Code.  
 
Finally, the executive branch shall construe and implement the Act in a 
manner consistent with the President's constitutional authorities to supervise 
the unitary executive branch and to protect sensitive national security, law 
enforcement, and foreign relations information. In particular, consistent with 
my constitutional authorities and section 301(c) of this Act, the executive 
branch shall construe the Act in a manner that preserves the authorities of 
the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other 
agency heads with regard to the operation, control, and management of 
national security systems.  
 
GEORGE W. BUSH  
THE WHITE HOUSE,  






Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002 (Sec 
3541 of title 44, US Code) 
 
 
“The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 ("FISMA", 
44 U.S.C. § 3541, et seq.) is a United States federal law enacted in 2002 as 
Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899). 
The Act was meant to bolster computer and network security within the 
Federal Government and affiliated parties (such as government contractors) 
by mandating yearly audits. 
FISMA has brought attention to cybersecurity within the Federal Government, 
which had previously been much neglected. As of February 2005, many 
government agencies received extremely poor marks on the official report 
card, with an average of 67.3% for 2004, an improvement of only 2.3 
percentage points over 2003.[1] This shows a marginal increase in how federal 
agencies prioritize cybersecurity, but experts warn that this average must 








OMB Circular A-130 (on 
Management of Federal 
Information Resources)  
 
 
“This Circular establishes policy for the management of Federal information 
resources. OMB includes procedural and analytic guidelines for implementing 







Homeland Security Act (HSA) 
 
 
“This section establishes the Department of Homeland Security in the 
executive branch of the United States government and defines its primary 
missions and responsibilities. The primary missions of the department include 
preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing the 
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism at home, and minimizing the 
damage and assisting in the recovery from any attacks that may occur. The 
Department’s primary responsibilities correspond to the five major functions 
established by the bill within the Department: information analysis and 
infrastructure protection; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
related countermeasures; border and transportation security; emergency 
preparedness and response; and coordination with other parts of the federal 
government, with state and local governments, and with the private sector. 
These primary missions and responsibilities are not exhaustive, and the 








Executive Order 13356 
(Strengthening the Sharing of 
Terrorism Information to 
 
“in order to further strengthen the effective conduct of United States 
intelligence activities and protect the territory, people, and interests of the 






Protect Americans)  
 
 
ordered as follows:  
 
Section 1. Policy. To the maximum extent consistent with applicable law, 
agencies shall, in the design and use of information systems and in the 
dissemination of information among agencies:  
 
(a) give the highest priority to (i) the detection, prevention, disruption, 
preemption, and mitigation of the effects of terrorist activities against the 
territory, people, and interests of the United States of America, (ii) the 
interchange of terrorism information among agencies, (iii) the interchange of 
terrorism information between agencies and appropriate authorities of States 
and local governments, and (iv) the protection of the ability of agencies to 
acquire additional such information; and  
 
(b) protect the freedom, information privacy, and other legal rights of 





Executive Order 13388 
(Strengthening the Sharing of 
Terrorism Information to 




Revokes Executive Order 13356 and  
 
Section 1. Policy. (same as 13356) 
 
Sec. 2. Duties of Heads of Agencies Possessing or Acquiring Terrorism 
Information.  
 
Sec. 3. Preparing Terrorism Information for Maximum Distribution.  
 
Sec. 4. Requirements for Collection of Terrorism Information Inside the United 
States.  
 









USA PATRIOT Improvement 




This new legislation “allows intelligence and law enforcement officials to 
continue sharing information and using the same tools against terrorists 
already employed against drug dealers and other criminals. While 
safeguarding Americans' civil liberties, this legislation also strengthens the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) so that it can better detect and disrupt 
terrorist threats, and it also gives law enforcement new tools to combat 
threats. America still faces dangerous enemies, and no priority is more 








Executive Order 13407 




“By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of America, including the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), 
and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.), it 
is hereby ordered as follows:  
Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to have an effective, 
reliable, integrated, flexible, and comprehensive system to alert and warn the 
American people in situations of war, terrorist attack, natural disaster, or 
other hazards to public safety and well-being (public alert and warning 
system), taking appropriate account of the functions, capabilities, and needs 
of the private sector and of all levels of government in our Federal system, 
and to ensure that under all conditions the President can communicate with 
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